United Nations intervention in Darfur : a case study by Akgün, Filiz
  
 
 
 
UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION IN DARFUR: A CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
A Master‟s Thesis 
 
 
 
by 
FİLİZ AKGÜN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of 
International Relations 
Bilkent University 
Ankara 
June 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
To My Family 
  
  
 
 
 
UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION IN DARFUR: A CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences 
of 
Bilkent University 
 
 
by 
 
 
FİLİZ AKGÜN 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
in 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY 
ANKARA 
 
June 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Prof. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu 
Supervisor 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Assistant Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu  
Examining Committee Member 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Assistant Prof. Aylin Güney 
Examining Committee Member 
 
 
 
Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Prof. Erdal Erel 
Director 
 
  
 
 
 
 iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION IN DARFUR: A CASE STUDY 
 
Akgün, Filiz 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Prof. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu 
 
June 2010 
 
 The crisis in Darfur started in February 2003 as an insurgency movement 
against the Sudanese government in Khartoum. The response of the ruling party to 
the uprising became devastating and paved the way to the extreme level of 
humanitarian suffering. The United Nations has been criticized widely due to its late, 
reluctant and ineffective response to this humanitarian crisis. This thesis aims to 
analyze the peace operation in Darfur within the context of the UN interventions in 
intrastate conflicts. The attitude of the UN in the Darfur crisis is interesting to 
examine as the case took place in the intersection of two opposite processes. On the 
one hand, there were significant attempts to regulate the norm of humanitarian 
intervention and to increase the effectiveness of peace operations. On the other hand, 
the impact of 9/11 attacks was radically changing the agenda of the world politics. 
This study tries to assess the intervention on the basis of four questions: How can the 
basic principles of peacekeeping be applied to that case? Has the AU/UN hybrid 
operation in Darfur succeeded? What were the reasons for the UN to respond lately 
and reluctantly in Darfur? How can the case be evaluated within the context of 
humanitarian interventions? In the final analysis, this thesis argues that despite the 
fact that significant normative progress has been achieved in rhetoric especially in 
notion of sacrificing state sovereignty for the sake of human security, the practice is 
still shaped by the political calculations of member states. 
 
Keywords: the United Nations, Darfur, peace operations, humanitarian intervention, 
UNAMID                                                
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ÖZET 
 
DARFUR‟DA BİRLEŞMİŞ MİLLETLER MÜDAHALESİ: BİR ÖRNEK OLAY 
İNCELEMESİ 
 
Akgün, Filiz 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu  
 
Haziran 2010 
 
Darfur‟daki kriz Şubat 2003‟te, Hartum‟daki Sudan hükümetine karşı bir 
ayaklanma olarak başlamıştır. İktidar partisinin isyana verdiği karşılık yıkıcı olmuş 
ve aşırı düzeyde insani acıya yol açmıştır. Birleşmiş Milletler, bu insani krize verdiği 
geç kalmış, ağırdan alan ve etkisiz tepki nedeniyle oldukça eleştirilmiştir. Bu tez, 
Darfur‟daki barış operasyonunu BM‟nin devlet-içi çatışmalara müdahaleleri 
bağlamında incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Darfur vakası iki zıt sürecin kesişiminde 
meydana geldiği için, BM‟nin Darfur krizindeki tutumu incelemeye değerdir. Bu 
dönemde, bir yandan insani müdahale normunu düzenlemek ve barış 
operasyonlarının etkililiğini artırmak için önemli çabalar sarfedilirken, diğer yandan 
11 Eylül saldırılarının etkisiyle dünya politikasının gündemi esaslı bir şekilde 
değişmekteydi. Bu çalışma, söz konusu müdahaleyi dört soru temelinde 
değerlendirir: Barışgücü operasyonlarının temel prensipleri bu vakaya nasıl 
uygulanabilir? Darfur‟daki Afrika Birliği/BM operasyonu başarılı olmuş mudur? 
BM‟nin Darfur‟a geç kalmış ve gönülsüz müdahalesinin sebepleri nelerdir?  Bu 
vaka, insan müdahaleler bağlamında nasıl değerlendirilebilir? Son tahlilde bu tez, 
söylemde, özellikle devlet egemenliğinden insan güvenliği için ödün verme 
konusunda, kayda değer normatif bir gelişmenin sağlandığı gerçeğine rağmen, 
uygulamanın halen üye devletlerin politik hesaplamaları sonucu şekillendirildiğini 
öne sürer.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Birleşmiş Milletler, Darfur, barış operasyonları, insan müdahale, 
UNAMID 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The current crisis in Darfur, in far western Sudan, started in February 2003 as 
an insurgency movement against the government in Khartoum. The causes of the 
uprising in the region consist of enduring and intertwined conflicts on ethnicity, 
political power, economic tensions and sharing scarce resources.
1
 When the 
rebellious Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality 
Movement initiated an attack on the government forces, the counter attack of the 
ruling National Islamic Front party became devastating and paved the way to the 
extreme violence. Since then, approximately 300,000 people died as a result of 
humanitarian disaster,
2
 and the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) was 
estimated to be nearly 2.7 million. The total population that was affected from the 
conflict in Darfur was reported to be almost 5 million (4,714,706 in exact numbers 
by January 2009).
3
 
 
                     
1United Nations Peacekeeping. “UNMIS.”Available at 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml (accessed in February, 2010). 
2
 ReliefWeb. 2008. “Scientific Evidence supports UN OCHA Extrapolation on Darfur Mortality.” 
Available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rwarchive/rwb.nsf/db900sid/AMMF-7DZHT5?OpenDocument 
(accessed in February, 2010). 
3
 United Nations Sudan Information Gateway. 2009. “Darfur Humanitarian Profile No.34.” Available 
at http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/090330%20DHP%2034%20narrative%201%20January%202009. 
pdf (accessed in February, 2010) p. 3. 
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The humanitarian situation in Darfur was defined as “one of the worst in the 
world” by the UN Under-Secretary-General in December 2003.4 However, it took 
sixteen months from the outbreak of the conflict for the Security Council to mention 
the situation in Darfur officially. On 11 June 2004, the parties were called to stop the 
fighting immediately with Resolution 1547. Unfortunately, the fighting escalated 
rather than being halted and the human sufferings like the murder of civilians, rape, 
displacement, kidnappings reached to unprecedented levels. The US Secretary of 
State Colin Powell labeled the widespread atrocities as “genocide” in his speech on 9 
September 2004
5
 and was followed by many activist organizations which were angry 
because of the inaction of the UN. Finally, the Security Council authorized the 
deployment of a hybrid African Union/United Nations peacekeeping operation in 
Darfur
6
 and UNAMID replaced the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) on 31 
December 2007. The mission is still on duty to reconcile the parties and to protect 
civilians.  
 The aim of this research is to explain and examine the peacekeeping 
operation in Darfur within the context of the UN interventions in intrastate conflicts. 
This thesis examines the events leading to the intervention first, then the decision-
making process, and lastly the operation itself. In the final analysis, this study tries to 
assess the intervention on the basis of four questions: How can the basic principles of 
peacekeeping be applied to that case? Has the AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur 
succeeded? What were the reasons for the UN to respond lately and reluctantly to 
                     
4
 United Nations News Centre. December 5, 2003. “Humanitarian and Security Situations in Western 
Sudan Reach New Lows, UN Agency Says.”  Available at 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=9094 (accessed in February, 2010). 
5
 CNN. September 9, 2004. “Powell Calls Sudan Killings Genocide.” Available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/09/09/sudan.powell/ (accessed in February, 2010). 
6
 The United Nations Security Council Resolution. July 31, 2007. S/RES/1769 (2007). 
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humanitarian sufferings in Darfur? How can the Darfur case be evaluated within the 
context of humanitarian interventions?  
 Although the Darfur case is relatively a new issue, a researcher does not meet 
much difficulty in finding studies in the literature addressing the subject from 
different dimensions and various perspectives. As a matter of course for a continuing 
conflict, a huge amount of existing literature is journal articles. However, scholarly 
works, field studies, memoirs generate a considerable amount of the literature, as 
well. For the sake of this thesis, the studies dealing with the humanitarian dimension 
of the crisis and analyzing the UN intervention are taken into consideration. These 
studies either focus on the level of atrocities in Darfur and how to label them or 
analyze international response within the context of humanitarian interventions. Both 
groups help to understand the attitude of the UN towards the issue and what the 
Darfur case indicates for the UN practice of intervention in intrastate conflicts. 
 As for how to label the atrocities there is a debate whether the humanitarian 
crisis in Darfur is a genocide or not. The following studies either review the debate 
or are supporters of one of the sides. The book Darfur and the Crime of Genocide 
(Hagan&Rymond-Richmond, 2008) examines the survey conducted by the US State 
Department which confirmed Colin Powell‟s words labeling the crisis “genocide”. 
On the other hand, the book questions the inaction towards a genocidal situation. On 
the opposite, in his book Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on 
Terror (2008), Mahmood Mamdani focuses on the danger created with the images of 
“genocide” which was presented as being conducted by “Arab” perpetrators against 
“African” victims. He also points out that the civil war first started without the 
involvement of the government. Darren Brunk argues in his article “Dissecting 
Darfur: The Anatomy of a Genocide Debate” (2008) that the memory of the Rwanda 
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genocide might have caused the international community to accept the situation in 
Darfur as “genocide” much easily. He adds that one should be very careful before 
assuming that disaster as such because the word has a very strong meaning in front of 
the international law and the public opinion.  
 In terms of analyzing the Darfur case within the humanitarian interventions 
context, studies examine and interpret the Security Council decisions, the UN 
intervention and some evaluates the actions with regard to the “responsibility to 
protect” understanding. There are many studies arguing that the case of Darfur has 
been a failure to test the “responsibility to protect” idea. This failure is derived either 
from the lack of political will to implement the idea or from the political limitations 
existing within the framework of the responsibility to protect. Therefore they are 
pessimistic for the future of the ideal, and humanitarian interventions as well, unless 
the concept will be improved with a clearer framework. Some of these studies are: 
Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo: Iraq, Darfur and the Record of Global 
Civil Society (Hehir, 2008), Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas In Action (Weiss, 
2008), “The Responsibility To Protect and the Conflict in Darfur: The Big Let-
Down” (Badescu and Bengholm, 2009), “Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility 
to Protect” (De Waal, 2007), “The Responsibility to Protect or the Trojan Horse? The 
Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq” (Bellamy, 2005). On the 
other hand, there are studies pointing the ineffective decision-making in the Security 
Council and its failure to react on time. “Rwanda and Darfur: The Media and the 
Security Council” (Melvern, 2007), “Still Playing Dice with the Lives: Darfur and 
the Security Council Resolution 1706” (Udombana, 2007), “The United Nations 
Security Council and the Question of Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur” (Bellamy 
and Williams, 2006) are some of them. In the thirteenth chapter of his book 
 5 
 
Surrender is Not An Option (2007), John Bolton touches upon the weakness of UN 
peacekeeping in Darfur and generally in Africa. However, not all the literature is 
judgemental about the intervention in Darfur. Some argue that the developments 
through the Darfur case can be optimistic for the future. Piiparinen (2007) is among 
those scholars with his article “The Lessons of Darfur for the Future of Humanitarian 
Intervention”, and claims that the “division of labour” provided by the UN, the AU, 
the EU and the NATO is a promising picture for the future operations and shows the 
cooperation of willingness and means. 
As a 21st century humanitarian crisis, the Darfur case is very important. Why 
it matters to study the intervention in Darfur can be explained under four headings. 
First of all, the timing and the evolution of the Darfur crisis make the case very 
interesting to examine. After the end of the Cold War, intervening in intrastate 
conflicts with humanitarian purposes gained enormous popularity, but also created a 
contradiction with the Charter principles about the use of force and non-intervention. 
Together with the failures in the 1990s, these contradictions have led the 
international community to reform and to codify the “humanitarian intervention” 
doctrine. As a result, the 21st century has welcomed the idea of “the responsibility to 
protect”, has argued for more active role for regional organizations, and has 
emphasized the importance of post-conflict peacebuilding, etc. However, at the very 
same time, September 11 attacks in 2001 and the following “war on terror” radically 
changed the direction of the world affairs and the political agenda. Therefore, it is 
not wrong to claim that the conflict in Darfur has taken place in the intersection of 
two opposite processes.           
Secondly, the situation in Darfur and the attitude of the United Nations in 
responding to the humanitarian crisis have raised intense debate among international 
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actors. On the one hand, the pro-interventionist argument have claimed that through 
the international norms of the 21
st
 century, such level of atrocities together with high 
amount of malnutrition, preventable diseases and displacement cannot be ignored as 
being an affair of Sudanese domestic politics.
7
 Therefore, late reaction of the 
Security Council, arguments of the members such as Russia, China, Pakistan, 
Algeria, Qatar, and the stance of the UN which refuses to call the attrocities as 
genocide have been harshly criticized. These are thought to reflect the concerns of 
extreme notion of state sovereignty, economic interests and political measures, and 
not in compliance with the “responsibility to protect” idea.  
On the other hand, non-interventionists have had three main arguments. 
Firstly, the unfavourable humanitarian conditions in Darfur, which are thought to 
occur because of the diseases and natural disasters to a great extent, have been 
exaggerated to assault the Sudanese government which has an Arabic/Muslim 
identity. Secondly, a UN intervention would be illegal according to Charter 
provisions as the issue is within the domestic jurisdiction of Sudan and any 
interference would possibly lead to the secession of the country. Thirdly, some states 
have become increasingly sceptic on the West‟s humanitarianism with the 
declaration of “war on terror” after 9/11 attacks.8 How those two opposite poles 
found a common point and authorized intervention is worth to analyze. 
 Thirdly, Darfur case is considered as the test case for the “responsibility to 
protect” idea. Since the ICISS has developed the concept in 2001, the idea of states 
bearing the responsibility to protect populations suffering from serious harm has 
                     
7
 David C. Gompert and et al. 2005. “Learning from Darfur: Building a Net-Capable African  
Force to Stop Mass Killing.” Center for Technology and National Security Policy.  Available at 
http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DTP%2015%20Darfur.pdf (accessed in February, 2010), 
p. 1. 
8
 Paul Williams and Alex Bellamy. 2005. “The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur,” 
Security Dialogue 36(1), p. 27. 
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been widely supported. In 2005, it was included in the final Outcome Document of 
the UN World Summit. The evolution of the crisis in Darfur has taken place during 
that period. Therefore, the case generates a turning point for the international 
community to see where it stands on humanitarian intervention issue, and to make a 
comparison about what has changed and what has not.  
 Lastly, the UN intervention in Darfur is important as it undertakes a hybrid 
operation with a regional organization for the first time. The willingness of African 
states to terminate the conflict in Sudan had led to the establishment of AMIS, the 
AU peacekeeping force which was deployed in Darfur in June 2004. The motto was 
“African solutions to African problems”; however, the material capabilities were not 
as sufficient as their willingness. When the UN Security Council authorized 
Resolution 1769, AMIS was replaced by the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, 
UNAMID. Therefore, this case is interesting to understand the rooms for cooperation 
for the UN with a regional organization.  
 This study is outlined with the aim of providing necessary background and 
conceptualization first, and then analyzing what has been described. In other words, 
this thesis makes a systematic-descriptive analysis. Chapter I explains the crisis in 
Darfur in detail and touches upon the international response. First of all, the 
geographical conditions and demographic situation of Darfur and Sudan are 
described together with the origins of the conflict within the historical context. Then 
the outcomes of the crisis are discussed in terms of the humanitarian catastrophe. 
Lastly, international involvement during the evolution of the crisis and the current 
situation are explained.  
A general framework for the UN interventions in intrastate conflicts is drawn 
in Chapter II. It begins with the definition of intervention and explains why it is one 
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of the most problematic concepts of international relations. The chapter continues 
with Charter provisions, emphasizes the “non-intervention” principle, and lists the 
exceptions. Later on, the UN practices in internal conflicts are examined with an 
emphasis on peacekeeping operations. Following, the humanitarian interventions are 
conceptualized and explained from ethical and legal points of view. The second 
chapter continues with an analysis of the Security Council decisions to intervene in 
internal conflicts, and ends with explaining how the success of operations are 
evaluated.  
 The third chapter provides the grounds to analyze four main questions of the 
study mentioned above. It is about the UN involvement in Darfur crisis and mainly 
concentrates on the decision-making for the intervention together with the attitudes 
of the states involved. In addition, the characteristics of the African Union/United 
Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UNAMID, are explained from functional, 
organizational and financial dimensions.     
Chapter IV attempts to answer the questions through the framework 
established in Chapter II. It analyzes the definition of the UN mission in Darfur, 
evaluates the success of the operation, provides the reasons for late and reluctant 
response, and makes assessment within the context of humanitarian interventions. 
 The conclusion echoes the analyses which are put forward through the whole 
paper and ends up with the overall assessment of Darfur case for the UN 
interventions in intrastate conflicts.   
 In this research, I rely on the official UN documents such as resolutions of the 
Security Council and the General Assembly, reports of the Secretary General, 
statements and letters by the Secretary General and the president of the Security 
Council, as well as the data gathered from institutions like the Office for the 
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Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Sudan Information 
Gateway. I also utilize the information and data provided by the institutions like the 
African Union, Amnesty International, International Crisis Group, other 
humanitarian agencies operating in the field, newspapers and electronic journals. 
They enable me to verify the objectivity of the official resources. In addition, I have 
been able to look at the issue from various dimensions with the invaluable 
contribution of the books and articles of authors from different perspectives and with 
several points of emphasis.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
   THE DARFUR CRISIS IN CONTEXT AND  
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
 
 
 Although the recent conflict in Darfur has taken the attentions for the last few 
years, it has deep causes rooted in the past. In order to analyze the process of UN 
involvement in that intrastate conflict, the origins, the beginning and the outcomes of 
the crisis should be understood as well as the international response to it. For that 
purpose, this chapter aims to explain the basic facts about Sudan and the Darfur 
region, first. Then, it examines the background leading to the recent insurgency in 
general. Next, the outcomes of the crisis especially after the counter-insurgency was 
initialized are analyzed with a specific emphasis on humanitarian aspect. Fourth, this 
chapter tries to provide a brief information on the responses of different international 
actors. As last, peace attempts and the contemporary situation in the region are 
explained. Indeed, it is difficult to refer to a complex crisis with all aspects in one 
chapter. Therefore it is worth to mention that the aim here is to cover the general 
basics to understand the essence of the Darfur issue.      
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2.1. Characteristics of Sudan and the Darfur Region 
  
       2.1.1. Geographical Facts  
 
 Sudan is located in Sub-Saharan Africa. It has common borders with Central 
African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya and Uganda; and a coastline with Red Sea. With its 
2,505,813 square kilometers total area, Sudan is the largest country in Africa and the 
10th in the world.
9
 By comparison, the area of Sudan is approximately one third of 
the size of the USA.
10
  
The country generally has a flat terrain with savannas and deserts in the north. 
Its climate is tropical in the south and dry desert in the north.
11
 Indeed, Sudan was 
once thought to be the granary of Africa with the great potential of its large savanna 
grass region.
12
 However, drought and the bad governance caused famine in Sudan 
several times. Recent reports show that the country is categorized as a “low-income, 
food-deficit country” by the UN,13 and ranks as the 150th out of 182 countries and 
territories on the 2007 Human Development Index.
14
 Despite its agricultural 
deficiency and water scarcity, Sudan is not dried of natural resources. There are 
found small reserves of iron ore, copper, chromium ore, zinc, tungsten, mica, silver, 
gold, and hydropower in the country.
15
 More significantly, in the southern part, 
Sudan has abundant amount of petroleum which was discovered in 1978.
16
 As a note, 
                     
9
 Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Factbook: Sudan.” Available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html (accessed in March, 2010). 
10
 Central Intelligence Agency. 
11
 Central Intelligence Agency. 
12
 Donald M. Snow. 2010. Cases in International Relations. New York: Longman, p. 112. 
13
 World Food Programme. “Countries: Sudan.” Available at http://www.wfp.org/countries/sudan 
(accessed in March, 2010).  
14
 Human Development Reports. “Human Development Report 2009: Sudan.” Available at 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_SDN.html (accessed in March, 
2010). 
15
 Central Intelligence Agency. 
16
 International Crisis Group. “Reports by Region: Sudan.” Available at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1230&l=1 (accessed in March, 2010). 
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it is worth to mention that this oil is controlled by the government which has 
improved its relations with China upon oil trade.
17
  
The Darfur region is located in the western part of Sudan having border with 
Chad. Its size is approximately 295,259 square kilometers which covers almost the 
size of France.
18
 The area is one of the poorest in the country enjoying neither oil 
wealth, nor sufficient lands for agriculture.
19
 In short, the region is a featureless and 
neglected area in Sudan. 
 
        2.1.2. People 
 
 Sudan comprises diverse groups of people in terms of ethnic (Arab, African 
and sub-tribes), religious (Muslims, Christians and indigenous beliefs) and socio-
economic (nomad and farmer) differences.
20
  
In fact, approximately 600 ethnic and linguistic groups are estimated to live in 
Sudan.
21
 However, for a more understandable division, a broader category of two has 
been preferred. From that point, the most general division in Sudan is religious: 
being Muslim or non-Muslim.
22
 Sunni Muslims consist of 70% of the population, 
while the Christians consist of the 5%. The rest 25% belong to the indigenous 
beliefs.
23
 As for regional distribution of religions, Muslims are dominant in northern 
Sudan. Whereas in the south, non-Muslim Sudanese are more prominent.
24
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Among Muslims, there is another division between the ones who claim to 
have an Arab identity and the ones who do not.
25
 Arabs consist of 39% of the total 
population which is given as 41 million according to July 2009 estimates.
26
 Those 
numbers mean that there are many Muslim Sudanese who are attached to non-Arabic  
identities. Africans in Darfur are among those Muslim Sudanese who had come to 
the region in the “distant past”.27 
When the people and population in Darfur are considered, estimating the 
number of habitants has been subject to dispute “either now or for almost any time in 
the past.”28 As an approximate number, the population of Darfur is 6-6,5 million 
according to the estimates of 2006.
29
 As for the people, there are both Arab and 
African tribes in the region; and almost everyone is Muslim.
30
 In addition, as Gérard 
Prunier simply points out, “in terms of skin colour everybody is black.”31 
Considering the name of the region, “Darfur” is the combination of the Arabic word 
dar meaning home, and the Fur which is the name of the ethnic group living in the 
region since “premodern” times.32 Apart from the Fur, the most prominent groups in 
Darfur could be listed as: the Tunjur, Meidob and Zaghawa in the north; the Berti 
and Birgid in the east; the Masalit in the west; and other smaller groups, the numbers 
of which are between forty and ninety depending on the classification.
33
 At that 
point, one thing should be noted before explaining the historical background that 
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many tribes in Darfur region have been subject to the process of “Sudanization” or 
“Arabization” since after the region became a part of Sudan in 1916.34     
 
        2.1.3. Historical Context 
 
 The relevant historical considerations for the background of the conflict can 
generally be analyzed in three main parts: colonial period, post-independence years, 
and the period after late 1980s.  
 The roots of many conflicts in Sudan go back to the colonial period. Sudan 
had been under Ottoman-Egyptian rule beginning in 1821, then under Anglo-
Egyptian rule which took over the control in 1898.
35
 In 1916, the Darfur region was 
annexed to that Anglo-Egyptian colonial administration in the territory which is 
today‟s Sudan. Up until then, the Dar Fur Sultanate had been independent and one of 
the most powerful kingdoms in the region for three centuries.
36
 The main motive 
lying behind the annexation of Dar Fur was nothing very ambitious but 
“pacification” of the area against “land-grabbing” French in westward.37  
 The annexation of Darfur to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan did not improve the 
conditions of the region. On the contrary, it paved the way for future conflicts. 
British administrators established a kind of “racial” hyerarchy which considered 
Arabs superior to non-Arabs.
38
 In addition, a process of “Sudanization” had started 
since 1917 with the aim of assimilating the people of Darfur into a “Sudanese 
political, economic and cultural entity”.39 The attitude towards the region in terms of 
education, health and economic development through 40-year colonial rule is 
considered as “worse than neglect” by Alex de Waal and Julie Flint. Moreover, that 
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ignorance is argued to be made on purpose. In their words, the records between 1917 
and 1950 show that:
40
 
In 1935, Darfur had just one elementary school, one „tribal‟ elementary 
school and two „sub-grade‟ schools. This was worse than neglect: British 
policy was deliberately to restrict education to the sons of chiefs, so that their 
autonomy would not be challenged by better-schooled Sudanese 
administrators or merchants. 
 
 For the health sector, the authors claim that within that period Darfur had the 
“lowest numbers of hospital beds” in whole Sudan. In addition, before 1940s, there 
had been no “maternity clinic” in the region. As for the economic development, first 
initiatives could start only in 1945 with “Economic Development, Darfur Province” 
file; however, there occurred no results out of it.
41
  
 In January 1956, Sudan gained its independence from the colonial rule. 
Unfortunately from then on, the new-born state could not enjoy an era of stability as 
a whole. The most prominent conflict had been the north-south conflict which had 
occurred for two long periods: from independence to 1972 and from 1983 to 2005.
42
 
This conflict had mainly derived from the complaints of the Christian and animist 
south from the oppressive politics of the ruling north. The discovery of oil in the 
south after 1970s intensified the conflict as the southern part blamed the government 
to exploit the oil revenues and wanted an equal share.
43
 The crisis went further when 
the attempts of intellectual elites to answer the main identity question, “who are we 
Sudanese?”, paved the way for the Islamist coup d‟état in the capital Khartoum on 30 
June 1989. The new administration adopted an active official program of 
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“Arabization and Islamization”44 which disregarded the rights of Christians and 
indigenous beliefs.  
 For the Darfur region in post-independence years, life had not been much 
different than before as Prunier stated that “what interested most people was the 
extension of the railway”.45 Later, after mid-1960s, the region was damaged and 
destabilized by the neighbouring Chadian and Libyan conflicts.
46
 Moreover, the 
drought and the famine in 1984 led the region become more devastated and 
marginalized. Prunier argues that “the worst period in Darfur‟s history” began after 
1984, and “it has not yet ended”.47 
 In the 1980s, especially after the famine, Darfurians started to complain that 
although they were being subject to the “becoming Sudanese” process, they were not 
treated as “full citizens of the Sudanese state”.48 This situation was interpreted as 
Darfur being a “prisoner of geography”.49 They were maladministered and 
government services were lacking. In addition, their land was suffering from 
“desertification, soil erosion and loss of fertility, and problems of water availability” 
which were getting worse with population growth.
50
 As a result, from the end of 
1980s on, the Darfur region has turned into a marginalized area of bloody conflicts. 
In Mamdani‟s words, the crisis in Darfur started as a “localized civil war” in 1987-
1989 and then turned into “rebellion” beginning in 2003.51  
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2.2. The Darfur Crisis 
 
 As it was mentioned above, the recent crisis in Darfur beginning in February 
2003 did not take place suddenly but as a result of a historical process and conflicts 
lasting more than a decade. In this part, the path leading to this recent conflict in 
Darfur will be explained in general. 
 Indeed, what surprised many authors studying Darfur has not been why there 
occurred a nationalized rebellion in the region. On the contrary, it has been why the 
situation in Darfur did not lead into a total war against the rulers before. De Waal 
explains that there were such attempts in the 1990s such as by the SPLA
52
, or later by 
Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes. However, those were lacking necessary leadership 
and coordination.
53
 Apart from those, there had been ongoing local conflicts such as 
the Arab-Fur War between 1987-1989, or the Arab-Masalit conflict between 1995-
1999.
54
 The reasons of both those local conflicts and recent rebellion were rooted in 
the historical context that was explained previously. In order to put the background 
in a more organized order, O‟Fahey classifies the reasons into three: demography, 
land, and administrative failure of Khartoum.
55
 
 First, the population of Darfur has increased from approximately 1.5 million 
to 6.5 million in fifty years; yet, the necessary resources and development have 
lacked to meet the needs of those people. Unsurprisingly, that has led to a breakdown 
in the region.
56
 Second, the main grievance has been because of “land”.57 There are 
two aspects which have caused the land to be a deadly issue.
58
 First was the 
parcelling of land between tribes in the colonial period. The administration gave 
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some tribes “homelands” and left the rest without land. Second was about the process 
of “drought” and “desertification” which has lasted for almost four decades and 
deepened the conflict between “tribes with land and those without”.59 The third cause 
of the Darfur crisis is the failure of Khartoum to consolidate its legitimacy in the 
region.
60
 About how the ruling elites have considered Darfur, O‟Fahey argues that 
“in periods of democratic rule Darfur was only of importance as voting fodder, while 
during non-democratic regimes it was only of importance within regional politics of 
Chad, Libya and Khartoum.”61 Therefore, the lack of legitimacy and the neglect of 
the rulers made Darfurians consider the government “something alien and „far 
away‟”.62 As a result, those three general factors led to a breakdown in Darfur with 
the beginning of the 1990s. 
 Turning back to the outbreak of the recent crisis of 2003, apart from the local 
conflicts, the distribution of the Black Book was one of the main signals of the 
upcoming insurgency. The copies of it, in its full name The Black Book: Imbalance 
of Power and Wealth in Sudan, were distributed in May 2000 in many parts of 
Sudan, mainly in Khartoum including the desks of top government officials.
63
 The 
Black Book was criticizing the inequalities in the country, neglectance and 
marginalization of periphery by the government; and demanding “justice and 
equality”.64 Prunier argues that the book said nothing new to the Northern elites that 
they did not know. However, he continues, although the contents were not the matter 
to create the shock, the main significance of it was the fact that somebody dared to 
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print “what everybody knew but did not want to talk about”.65 That somebody called 
themselves “The Seekers of Truth and Justice”66 which would then play one of the 
main roles as Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Darfur rebellion. 
 Giving the exact date of beginning of the uprising in Darfur is difficult as 
armed opposition against government forces began to be planned in 2001.
67
 
However, it is accepted internationally that the recent conflict started when two rebel 
groups – Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudan Liberation 
Movement/Army (SLM/A) – launched an attack against “government installations” 
in February 2003.
68
 Upon this, the government of Sudan initialized a counter-
insurgency by arming and supporting “proxy” militias called “Janjaweed”, which 
means “men on horseback” in Arabic.69  
“There had been violence before,” Prunier argues “but by late July 2003 it 
had assumed a completely new scale and exploded.”70 There occurred “new patterns 
of repression”71 as the tactics of “aerial bombardments, rape, abduction, mass 
execution, and the destruction of food and water resources”72 were targeting mainly 
the civilians in Darfur.  
 
2.3. Humanitarian Outcomes
73
 of the Darfur Conflict 
 
  The catastrophic humanitarian outcome of the crisis have reached to 
unprecedented levels in a very short time that the UN Under-Secretary referred to the 
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situation in December 2003 as “one of the worst in the world” in terms of 
humanitarian crisis.
74
 As it was mentioned above, there were reports of widespread 
atrocities including the murder of civilians, forcible displacement, rape, kidnap, 
humiliation, beating, damage of water and food supplies, etc. In addition, there were 
non-violent aspects risking the lives of civilians such as diseases and malnutrition. 
As a result, by January 2009, the number of people that were affected from the 
conflict in Darfur was reported to be almost 5 million.
75
 
 
        2.3.1. Murder of Civilians 
 
 When the type of weapons, “bombs” and engines used in the warfare, and the 
attitudes of government-backed militias are considered, it is hard to deny that one of 
the main targets was not just the rebels but the civilians. In detail, “four-engine 
Antonov An-12s” were dropping old oil drums which were filled with explosives and 
metal pieces. Such mechanisms were “completely useless” for military purposes; 
however, they were deadly terror weapons against civilians.
76
 In addition, there are 
reports that combat helicopters and “MiG” fighter-bombers were used for machine-
gunning or rocketing large targets such as schools, mosques or warehouses.
77
 
Moreover, there were huge amount of records of physical mistreatments by 
Janjaweed militias such as surrounding the villages, stealing belongings of villagers, 
humiliating them with reference to their “African” origins, shooting and beating men, 
raping girls and women, kidnapping children and burning houses.
78
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 In his speech on 9 September 2004,
79
 the US Secretary of State Colin Powell 
called the widespread atrocities “genocide” and fueled a hot debate on labeling the 
crisis. Since then, it has been intensely debated whether the government of Sudan 
intended a genocide through killing most of the non-Arabs in the region, or aimed an 
ethnic cleansing through forcing the survivors out, or just lost control over the 
counter-insurgency. This question has played a confusing role for the reaction of 
international community, especially the UN.  
 
        2.3.2. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees 
 
In the very first years of the conflict, the UN estimated that between 700 and 
2,000 villages were “totally or partially destroyed”, almost 2 million people had to be 
internally displaced and approximately 200,000 people became refugees
80
 mainly 
fleeing to neighbouring Chad. According to the latest estimations by January 2009, 
those numbers have increased to 2,7 million for the IDPs in Darfur and to 268,000 
for the refugees from Darfur.
81
 Although they fled from atrocities, there occurred 
many obstacles for those people in terms of the availability of basic conditions for 
the survival such as nutrition and security. 
 At the very beginning, in September 2003, there were 70,000 refugees in 
Chad and an 400,000 displaceds in Darfur.
82
 As the first reaction, UNHCR asked for 
$10.3 million for the refugees in Chad.
83
 However, the first food aids for refugees 
could arrive in February 2004.
84
 Yet, the Darfurians fleeing to Chad were relatively 
lucky, as they had been fed by local Chadian population for months before the aids 
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could arrive. In addition, they were safer in terms of Janjaweed attacks except the 
camps very near to Sudanese border.
85
 On the other hand, for the larger number of 
internally displaced persons, there were no “effective mechanisms for providing 
food” mainly due to the permission restriction of the government of Sudan.86 Flint 
and de Waal argue that the starvation in Darfur was not due to mere neglectance but 
a “military strategy”.87 Prunier explains the situation at that period as “people had 
almost nothing to eat, and foraging for wild foods, which had been a life-saving 
device during the 1984 famine, was impossible because of Janjaweed activity 
outside.”88 In later periods, the appeals for aid have increased tremendously. The UN 
announced in 2005 that the amount needed for Sudan relief was about $1.5 billion.
89
 
The necessities have not reduced as the crisis evolved. For instance, according to the 
latest estimations, there will be 4,3 million Darfurians needing food assistance during 
the year 2010.
90
   
 
        2.3.3. Rape and Kidnap 
 
 Collecting the exact data for the crimes of sexual violence and kidnappings is 
difficult. The main information related to such crimes are gathered through 
interviews with the displaced people in the camps.  
 In July 2004, Amnesty International prepared a report called “Sudan: Darfur: 
Rape as a Weapon of War: Sexual Violence and Its Consequences”. The organization 
interviewed with the refugees in order to estimate the level of sexual violence and 
                     
85
 Prunier, p. 132. 
86
 Daly, p. 291. 
87
 Flint and de Waal, p. 146. 
88
 Prunier, p. 131. 
89
 Daly, p. 292. 
90
 United Nations Sudan Information Gateway. February 2010. “Sudan Humanitarian Overview.” 
6(2). Available at 
http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/Sudan%20Humanitarian%20Overview%20vol6%20no2%20Feb%20
2010.pdf (accessed in April, 2010), p. 2. 
 23 
 
abduction together with the damage those created on women and the community.
91
 
The Report did not discriminate the sexual violence committed by either the 
insurgents or the Janjaweed. The findings revealed that there had occurred few cases 
of sexual violence by JEM or SLA. Yet, it was not reported to be used as a 
systematic weapon. In that case, Amnesty International tries to explain the situation 
with following sentences:
92
  
This does not mean that the insurgents do not commit human rights abuses. It 
may be because they do not happen on a large scale or because the refugees 
that Amnesty International met were not victims of such attacks or because 
the refugees would only report violations by those they perceived as their 
aggressors. 
 
 As a result, many abuses narrated by the refugees were by the government 
backed counter-insurgency units. The use of rape was tactical, and in many cases 
committed openly in front of the public.
93
 In addition to the sexual violence that 
those girls and women faced, they were often “scarred” or “branded” with a “hot 
iron” to reveal the public that they were “spoilt” women.94 That created further 
physical and psychological damage for both the victims and the community they 
belonged to. 
 As for many kidnapping cases, the refugees reported that any news from the 
men, children or women kidnapped was almost never heard again.
95
 In some cases, 
militias abducted girls and women for sexual abuse and then let them go or 
murdered. However, those girls and women were not sold as “slaves” unlike the 
situation in the South Sudan. Prunier argues it was mainly because of the difficulty to 
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find buyers for them due to the “religious taboo” prohibiting selling Muslims as 
slaves.
96
 
 
        2.3.4. Death Toll 
 
Counting the deaths in Darfur which occurred due to the violent (atrocities) 
and non-violent (diseases, malnutrition, non-eligible conditions, etc.) reasons during 
the conflict is very difficult. The latest independent survey on mortality rate in the 
region was conducted by the WHO in 2005, which focused on especially the non-
violent deaths.
97
 The survey revealed that between October 2003 and 2004, there 
occurred 10,000 deaths per month.
98
 Up to date, many estimations have been made 
according to the results of this survey. The area specialist John Prendergast listed two 
simple reasons for the lack of studies in that issue. First, he argues that “the Sudanese 
government does not want a new mortality study done for Darfur”.99 Second, “the 
UN won‟t pursue it” in conflicting with the government‟s stance.100 
In April 2008, the UN extrapolated the death toll to be 300,000 people up to 
that day.
101
 Although this was announced as “not a very scientifically based 
figure”,102 the CRED103 supported this claim with its “scientifically sound survey 
data”.104 However, Prunier argues that the research and the calculation of both 
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violent and non-violent mortality rate by Sudan specialist Eric Reeves in 2006 
possibly provide closer estimations to the facts. He quoted from Reeves that
105
: 
Assuming an average 50% decline in violent mortality for the remaining 
months of 2004 and a 75% decline in violent mortality for 2005 and 2006 to 
date, this still yields an additional 60,000 violent deaths. (...) [In addition] 
monthly mortality in Darfur attributable to disease and malnutrition in June 
2005 stood at over 6,000 (a CMR of 0.6 for a war-affected population of 3.4 
million x 30 days = 6,100 excess deaths/month).  
 
 From those calculations, Prunier estimates the death toll to be between 
480,000 to 530,000 even in 2006.
106
 
 
2.4. International Response During the Evolution of the Conflict 
 
 The responses of international actors to the escalating crisis in Darfur have 
been criticized mainly on two grounds: First, the initial reaction came too late and 
too slow; second, the attempts were ineffective. Indeed, although sporadic conflicts 
leading to the recent crisis started to occur almost one decade ago, there was almost 
no mention to them at all even in the “specialist African press”.107 The primary 
reason for this was the fact that the main concern of the world for Sudan had been on 
the North-South conflict and how to reconcile the parties. In addition, even the 
Sudanese government was used to the occurrence of tribal conflicts in the peripheries 
and paid no specific attention to Darfur. 
 The first mention to the increasing “lawlessness” in the region came from 
Amnesty International who warned about the increasing death toll and emerging 
crisis in the region with a press release on 21 February 2003.
108
 Then International 
Crisis Group tried to take the attentions to the situation in Darfur in December 2003 
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with a media release called “The Other War in Sudan”.109 However, it was the 
statements of the UN‟s humanitarian coordinator in Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, which 
made the Darfur case an important issue for the world media and the public opinion. 
In March 2004, he compared the crisis to Rwanda and said, “the only difference 
between Rwanda and Darfur now is the numbers involved”.110 The time was 
“critical” to take the attention to a crisis as the year was the tenth anniversary of the 
Rwandan genocide. From that time on, many humanitarian activists and NGOs 
initiated big campaigns to pressure the governments and capable organizations to 
refer to Darfur and do something. In the following, the attitudes and initiatives of 
main international organizations involved in the crisis, the African Union, the 
European Union, NATO and the United Nations, will be explained in a brief way. 
 
        2.4.1. The African Union 
 
 The AU first involved in the conflict in April 2004, when it tried to mediate 
the parties to sign “N‟Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement”.111 Although 
this agreement was a flawed ceasefire, it led to the establishment of the African 
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in June 2004, originally as an observer mission.
112
 
The UN welcomed and supported the AU initiatives and urged the member states 
under Chapter VII to reinforce the AU mission. In October 2004, AMIS enhanced 
the number of its personnel and its mandate. It was assigned with tasks as “to 
monitor and observe compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed 
in N‟Djamena on 8 April 2004”, “to contribute to a secure environment for the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance and the return of refugees and internally 
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displaced persons”.113 In mid-2005, the mission further increased its initial numbers 
from 465 to almost 8,000.
114
 However, the mission still lacked necessary budget and 
troops; therefore was dependent to the aids of donors.
115
 Eventually the AU, in 
Mamdani‟s words, “quickly became a target both for the belligerents and for 
anybody agitated by the conflict”.116 In December 2007, AMIS was replaced by 
African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
117
  
 Darfur is the first serious crisis that the African Union has faced since it 
transformed from the Organization of African Unity. It has revealed a great 
enthusiasm to involve in the conflict management since April 2004. Indeed, the AU 
adopted a position as African solutions to African problems which seemed to be 
supported by the West. This attitude of the AU is generally interpreted in two ways. 
On the one hand, it is argued that the AU became “peacekeeper and peacemaker” in 
the conflict as “no other organization would take on the challenge”.118 On the other 
hand, it is claimed that the AU considered Darfur crisis as a chance to prove its 
success and effectiveness “both in the conference room and on the ground”; in 
addition as a chance to emerge as a “major new player” in conflict resolution.119 
Anyway, whatever the motivation of the AU has been, its inefficiency proves the 
interdependency of political will and military means. In that case, the AU had the 
necessary political will to terminate the conflict. However, it had very limited 
capabilities to succeed at all.    
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        2.4.2. The European Union and NATO 
 
 The EU and NATO involved in the crisis through reinforcing the military 
operation of the AU technically and financially. The EU backed up AMIS through 
financial support worth almost half of the operation, while NATO contributed
through providing airlifts and training. However, none of them showed signs of 
interest in military involvement. 
 On 26 April 2005, the AU asked NATO for logistical support to AMIS. As a 
result, NATO started to help the AU in expanding its peacekeeping mission in June 
2005. This help consisted of “providing airlift for the transport of additional 
peacekeepers into the region and by training AU personnel”.120 Assistance of NATO 
ended with the transfer of AMIS to UNAMID on 31 December 2007.
121
 The AU-
NATO cooperation in that sense is important as it was for the first time in NATO‟s 
history to cooperate with the AU and to operate in Africa.
122
 
  Again upon the request of the AU, the EU promised to back up AMIS 
especially in financial terms. Indeed, the EU became the main contributor to the 
AMIS budget providing $142 million out of $301 million.
123
 In addition, the 
Organization reported to provide equipments, training, transportation and military 
and civilian personnel for the mission.
124
 This supporting action started in July 2005 
and ended in December 2007.
125
 
 The role that the EU played in Darfur case has led to different interpretations. 
On the one hand, it is argued that the EU could adopt a more active and especially a 
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military position in the conflict as it had historical ties and continuing interests in the 
African continent.
126
 Bernard Kouchner
127
 claims that the EU could stabilize the 
borders through Chad and protect the Darfurian refugees. Indeed, he argues, the EU 
would be the perfect actor to play this role while the US would not because of its bad 
reputation in the Muslim world.
128
 On the other hand, many commentators disagree 
and argue that the situation in Darfur exceeded the EU‟s capacity to deal with alone. 
Therefore, any military involvement would be very limited and ineffective.
129
 
 
        2.4.3. The United Nations 
 
 The response to the situation in Darfur attracted harsh criticisms on the UN. 
In fact, the UN was involved in the region through its sub-agencies, delivering 
humanitarian aid, establishing refugee commissions, etc. The organization carried the 
60% of financial burden at humanitarian level.
130
 However, the criticisms were on 
the ground that the UN was hesitant to shift its actions from humanitarian to 
political/military level. The primary reasons for the UN reluctance to have a strict 
political position in the case are two in general. First, the UN avoided any action 
which could paralyze the ongoing peace process in Sudan between North and South. 
Second, the positions of members have differed on Darfur issue both within the 
Security Council and the General Assembly. Indeed, this issue will be held in the 
third chapter in detail. In the following, the political actions of the UN are covered in 
brief in order to provide a general information. 
 When the crisis outbroke in Darfur, the UN was busy trying to reconcile the 
parties to the North-South conflict of Sudan. As a result, the United Nations Advance 
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Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS) was established upon the Resolution 1547 of 11 
June 2004 with a mandate “to facilitate contacts with the parties concerned and to 
prepare for the introduction of an envisaged UN peace support operation”.131 The 
Security Council referred to the situation in Darfur for the first time again in 
Resolution 1547 and called the parties to stop fighting immediately.
132
 On 30 July 
2004, through the Resolution 1556, the UNSC assigned additional duties to 
UNAMIS regarding Darfur.
133
 In addition, the Council gave a thirty-day deadline to 
Sudanese government to disarm the Janjaweed militias and threatened with 
imposement of sanctions.
134
 However, the main attitude of the UN was reinforcing 
the AU mission in the region but not to involve directly in military terms.  
On 18 September 2004, the SC welcomed and supported the idea of an 
expanded AU presence in the region, and recalled the government to disarm and 
prosecute the Janjaweed.
135
 In addition, this time the SC assigned the Secretary-
General to investigate the human rights violations in Darfur, to identify the 
perpetrators, and to determine whether genocidal acts occurred.
136
 Upon this 
resolution, The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID) was 
established which then published a report on its mission on 25 January 2005. The 
Commission concluded that the situation in Darfur did not constitute „genocide‟. 
However, it approved the practice of widespread and systematic violence upon 
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civilians. As a result, the ICID claimed that the government of Sudan committed 
crimes against humanity, while the rebel groups were responsible for war crimes.
137
 
In addition, the report submitted a list of fifty-one individuals for “criminal 
investigation”, all of which were either government officials or Janjaweed militias 
except seven rebels.
138
  
 The next action that the UN took upon the report of the ICID was referring 
the case to the Prosecutor of International Criminal Court (ICC). On 31 March 2005, 
Resolution 1593 was adopted under Chapter VII with eleven votes in favour, no 
votes against, and four abstentions – Algeria, Brazil, China and the United States.139 
It has been the first time that the SC referred a case to the ICC since the Rome Treaty 
was put into force on 1 July 2002.
140
 Indeed, this referral had become the first 
international reaction which really worried President Omar al-Bashir and the 
government.
141
 Here, it is worth to mention that although Sudan has not ratified the 
Rome Statute, that resolution is obligatory for the government as it is authorized 
under Chapter VII. In April 2007, the ICC judges issued arrest warrants for the 
former Sudanese Minister of State for the Interior Ahmad Harun and Janjaweed 
leader Ali Kushayb “for 51 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes”.142 
The third arrest warrant by the ICC in Darfur case was again a “first” in the Court‟s 
history. On 4 March 2009, President Omar Al Bashir, sitting Head of State, was 
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issued a warrant for the arrest for “war crimes and crimes against humanity”.143 The 
press release of the ICC reports that:
144
  
He is suspected of being criminally responsible, as an indirect (co-) 
perpetrator, for intentionally directing attacks against an important part of the 
civilian population of Darfur, Sudan, murdering, exterminating, raping, 
torturing and forcibly transferring large numbers of civilians, and pillaging 
their property. This is the first warrant of arrest ever issued for a sitting Head 
of State by the ICC. 
 
Up until now, the Government of Sudan has “systematically refused to 
cooperate with the Court” in all three cases of arrest warrants. 
The international campaign for a more robust military intervention than the 
AMIS continued to pressure the UN, while the SC reiterated its position through 
consequtive resolutions as supporting an expanded AU presence in the region, and 
contributing to peace process and humanitarian relief actions. Eventually in June 
2007, the Sudanese government accepted the deployment of a joint AU/UN force in 
Darfur. On 31 July 2007, the SC adopted the Resolution 1769 under Chapter VII and 
authorized the establishment of an unprecedented hybrid AU/UN peacekeeping 
operation in Darfur.
145
 UNAMID formally replaced AMIS on 31 December 2007.
146
 
It is one of the largest operations of the UN with 21,800 uniformed personnel in total 
by February 2010.
147
 The core mandate of UNAMID is the “protection of civilians”. 
Moreover, it is also assigned with tasks as “contributing to security for humanitarian 
assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, assisting an 
inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule 
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of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad 
and the Central African Republic”.148  
UNAMID still operates in the region that its mandate has been extended to 31 
July 2010 with the Resolution 1881.
149
 
 
2.5. Peace Agreement and the Current Situation   
 
 Since the outbreak of the conflict, international actors attempted to contain 
the crisis through mediating talks between parties. The very first ceasefire was 
materialized under the mediation of Idriss Déby, the president of Chad, in Abéché. 
On 3 September 2003, the Sudanese government and SLM/A signed an agreement to 
cease the hostilities for forty-five days and agreed to start “comprehensive political 
talks”.150 However, Dawit Toga reports that although the fighting between the 
government and the rebels lessened upon the ceasefire, the civilian population started 
to suffer from an intensified violence.
151
 Later on, the African Union took the 
initiative to end the conflict and played the mediator role in Inter-Sudanese Peace 
Talks. On 8 April 2004, the parties signed the N‟djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire 
Agreement. Through this agreement, they accepted to cease the hostilities, to release 
all prisoners related to the conflict, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance and emergency relief, in addition the establishment of African Union 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as an observer mission.
152
 However, N‟djamena was a 
flawed agreement as it existed in two versions which had inconsistencies.
153
       
 Seven rounds of negotiations following N‟djamena were finalized in May 
2006 in Abuja, Nigeria. As a result, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed 
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on May 5 by the government of Sudan and one faction of SLM/A headed by Minni 
Arkoy Minawi. However, the other SLM/A faction led by Abdel Wahid Mohamed al 
Nur and the JEM led by Dr. Khalil Ibrahim refused to sign the agreement.
154
 
Therefore, the agreement failed to achieve peace. On the contrary, there occurred 
violent protests in Darfur “immediately after the signing ceremony”.155 Former rebel 
Minawi started to use force against adversaries to impose the implementation of 
DPA and intensified the violence in the region. In addition, the prestige of the AU 
diminished in the eyes of Darfurians and the organization became an enemy for the 
non-signatories as it was “determined to make the agreement work”.156 The result 
was reported by the UN as “200,00 people [were] displaced by intensified fighting 
and increased insecurity between July and September [2006]”.157 Still, DPA was very 
significant for the international community which is considered as a basis for a 
“lasting political solution and sustained security in Darfur”.158 Toga connects the 
failure in implementing the DPA to especially the lack of faith between parties and 
states that:
159
 
The peace negotiations were launched when the conflict between the SLM/A 
and JEM on the one side, and the GoS [Government of Sudan] on the other, 
was itself less than six months old- at a time when both parties believed they 
could advance their positions on the battlefield. Therefore, each was a 
reluctant negotiator from the outset. (...) Throughout the entire negotiating 
process, fighting continued on the ground in Darfur, both between GoS and 
the movements and among the movements themselves. This ...indicated the 
poor faith of the parties...  
 
 Eventually on 23 February 2010, one of the largest non-signatory groups, 
JEM, bilaterally signed a preliminary peace deal with the Sudanese government. 
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However, commentators are not very optimistic that this would sign the end of the 
conflict.
160
 On the other hand, SLM/A still refuses to talk to the government and 
demands an “end to all violence before negotiations begin”.161  
Indeed contemporarily, the future of the situation in Darfur is still very 
frustrating to be foreseen. Even the UNAMID officials lately reported that “the 
security situation in Darfur remains relatively calm, but unpredictable.”162  
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CHAPTER III 
 
UN INTERVENTIONS IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS 
 
 
With the end of the Cold War, the level of conflicts has shifted from inter-
state to intra-state level. Statistics show that between 1989 and 2003, 109 of 116 
armed disputes have been intrastate conflicts; moreover, 20 of them have been 
internationalized.
163
 How to respond these crises has caused difficulties for the UN in 
both practical and legal terms: First, it has lacked sufficient capabilities to deal with 
new conflicts. Second, „intervention‟ and „internal affairs‟ were two contrary terms 
for the basis that the Organization was founded on. This chapter aims to explain and 
understand how the UN has evolved in time to respond to the newly emerging 
internal conflicts, and where it stands now. In other words, the purpose of this 
chapter is to offer a framework to analyze the UN respond to Darfur case. It consists 
of four parts and searches answers for questions like: Is it legal to intervene in 
internal conflicts? What is the role of the „use of force‟ in UN operations? How has 
the UN peacekeeping evolved in time? Do states have a „right‟ and/or a „duty‟ to 
intervene with humanitarian purposes? What is the impetus for the UN in deciding to 
intervene? What are the measures to evaluate UN operations as succeeded or failed? 
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3.1. Basic Concerns  
       3.1.1. Definition of Intervention 
Intervention is a problematic term as it brings two controversial concepts of 
international relations to the fore: sovereignty and the use of force. From the 
traditional point of view, the normal state of affairs in international relations is 
nonintervention.
164
 That principle is originated from the principle of sovereignty as 
understood from the words of Vincent: “To ask what areas the principle of 
nonintervention protects is equivalent to asking what matters are within the domestic 
jurisdiction of states.”165 That is to say that intervention can be considered as the 
“conceptual opposite” of sovereignty.166 
The other aspect is that the term intervention is often regarded as a synonym 
for “the threat or use of force” within the framework of the UN Charter.167 However, 
this “coercive-military” attachment to intervention is problematic and too precise for 
some scholars
168
 because this approach is thought to omit diplomatic and economic 
interferences which may not necessitate coercive use of force at all times.
169
 For 
instance, Bull‟s understanding of intervention which he thinks may be “forcible or 
non-forcible”170 underestimates the role of the condition of coerciveness in 
interventions. Moreover, Murphy explains the broader understanding of intervention 
including acts like “publicly condemning the state, ceasing diplomatic relations, 
expelling the state from membership, providing funding to opposition groups in the 
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other state, imposing economic sanctions or withholding economic benefits.”171 He 
adds that the term is narrowed by humanitarian intervention scholars to the “threat or 
use of armed force”.172 Another explanation defines intervention as sum of acts 
involving “the physical crossing of borders” – not always with military force – and 
isolating a state through cutting off diplomatic or economic relations.
173
 
On the other hand, Vincent argues that political, military or economic 
interventions are among the types of intervention, but classifying the types is not 
defining the term.
174
 He formulates an “approximate definition” of intervention as:175 
that activity undertaken by a state, a group of states or an international               
organization which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another       
state. It is a discrete event having a beginning and an end, and it is aimed at 
the authority structure of the target state. It is not necessarily lawful or 
unlawful, but it does break a conventional pattern of international relations.         
 This definition is an appropriate one to apply as the working definition for 
“intervention” in this study with two slight changes. First, this paper regards the use 
of armed forces, in other words military intervention as the type of activity. 
Secondly, it is accepted in this study that within the complex nature of contemporary 
politics, there may be deviation from a strict adherence to the “coerciveness” as a 
condition of intervention especially in the post-Cold War peace operations. 
 
       3.1.2. Related Provisions of the Charter 
 
With Article 2(1), the UN Charter states that “the Organization is based on 
the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”176 This emphasizes the 
role of the state sovereignty in international relations. As nonintervention is the 
                     
171
 Sean D. Murphy. 1996. Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World 
Order. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 9. 
172
 Murphy, p. 10. 
173
 G. M. Lyons, and M. Mastanduno. 1995. Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International 
Intervention. London: The John Hopkins University Press, p. 10. 
174
 Vincent, p. 10. 
175
 Vincent, p. 13. 
176
 UN Charter, Article 2(1). Available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ (This citation is 
valid in this paper for all references made to the UN Charter; with a change in Article number.) 
 39 
 
complementary principle of state sovereignty in international law,
177
 the Charter sets 
clear provisions related to intervention as restricting the use of force and interference 
in internal affairs of another state. 
 The main rule on the prohibition of the threat or use of force is provided in 
Article 2(4): “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” In 
addition, Article 2(7) mentions the inviolability of sovereign rights of states 
providing: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under 
the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” Likewise, with Resolution 2625, the 
General Assembly declared the provisions mentioned above as two of seven codified 
principles for friendly relations and cooperation among states in accordance with the 
Charter.
178
       
 These two articles seem to be clear about what they indicate. However, both 
consist of exceptions which can be extracted from the mention of relevant Charter 
provisions within their texts. In addition, they are subject to exceptions which are 
derived from the sources of international law as given in the Statute of International 
Court of Justice.
179
 In terms of Article 38, international conventions and treaties, 
customary international law, general principles of law, previous decisions and 
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scholarly views should be taken into consideration while assessing the legality of an 
action. In this part, the exceptions for Article 2(4) and Article 2(7) are considered 
analyzing the relevant provisions of the Charter. Different interpretations and the 
other sources of international law are examined in a further part in this chapter which 
deals with the legality of humanitarian interventions. 
 While prohibiting the threat or use of force, Article 2(4) leaves open room for 
maneuver with two phrases: against territorial integrity or political independence of 
a state and or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
The former phrase is about the legal interpretation of the purpose of actions: whether 
the use of force can be allowed in case the aim has not been “to overthrow the 
government or seize the authority of the state” and has been in conformity with the 
purposes of the UN.
180
 The latter part indicates consistency with the purposes of the 
organization and is debated what it intends to provide indeed. One approach argues 
that the threat or use of force can be allowed in case there is necessity to protect the 
purposes mainly set in Article 1.
181
 Those purposes include the maintenance of 
international peace and security, equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
promoting respect for human rights and for fundemental freedoms without 
discrimination.
182
 On the opposite, the counterapproach states that the “or” means 
further prohibition of the use of force when it is inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations.
183
 
 Article 2(4) is one of the imperative provisions of international law. It is 
accepted by the international community of states in 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
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Law of Treaties that no derogation from this principle is permited.
184
 However, it can 
be regarded as out of question when “self-defense” is the issue. The Charter keeps 
the right of self-defense of states – either individually or collectively – sacred.185 
Therefore Article 51 is granted as the main exception to Article 2(4). Article 51 
provides that “nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.”186  
 Secondly, enforcement measures under Chapter VII are the other exceptions 
to Article 2(7). Authority of the UN Security Council to determine the threat to the 
peace and to decide enforcement measures are the essence of Chapter VII. Article 39 
states that “the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” However, it does not define what 
constitutes the threat or the act of aggression. The Security Council is empowered to 
identify an action as such and decide what measures should be taken. Article 41 and 
42 provides that economic and diplomatic measures can be pursued and if they 
become inadequate, military means can be considered “to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.” As another exception to the prohibition of Article 
2(7), the consent of the host state should be mentioned. Indeed, the practice of 
peacekeeping operations is based on this exception which will be explained in the 
further parts.   
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 As strongly emphasized in Chapter VII, the Security Council is the main 
authority even when the issue is self-defense of an individual state. Members are to 
report to the Security Council immediately when they start to exercise their right of 
self-defence. That is to say that the Council is assigned by the member states the 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in 
Article 24. Regional actors and organizations are empowered to undertake military 
operations when there is a risk for international peace. Nevertheless, they are not 
allowed to take such enforcement action without the authorization of the Security 
Council.
187
 One exception to the authority of the Council is about the role of the 
General Assembly. Uniting for Peace Resolution of the General Assembly 
(Resolution 377) of 1950 enables the General Assembly to take the initiative when 
the Security Council is in a deadlock to act unanimously.
188
 Uniting for Peace 
Resolution was first used in the Korean War (1950-1953), then in Suez Canal crisis 
(1956) and has been used ten times since.
189
 However, although it “provide[s] a high 
degree of legitimacy for an intervention”190, the Resolution “has lost much of its 
importance” and has become debatable in legal terms.191  
 
       3.1.3. The Instruments of UN Practice in Internal Conflicts 
 
 When the UN faces an internal dispute to deal with, there are a number of 
instruments to resolve the conflict through either settling the issue peacefully or 
using the enforcement measures. Some of those means are provided in the UN 
Charter
192
 while some others are evolved through practice. Oudraat categorized these 
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instruments into seven:
193
 humanitarian assistance; fact-finding; traditional 
peacekeeping; multifunctional peacekeeping; economic sanctions and arms 
embargoes; judicial enforcement measures; the use of military force.  
The last three of the measures listed are coercive in nature and falls under 
enforcement activities of the UN. As this study refers to the military types of 
interventions, instruments other than “the use of force” – humanitarian assistance, 
fact-finding, economic sanctions and arms embargoes, judicial enforcement 
measures – are not taken into consideration in detail. Although peacekeeping is not 
accepted as combat operation, it will also be examined on a comparative basis 
especially within the context of changing dynamics of conflicts in the post-Cold War 
era.  
 
3.1.3.1. The use of force 
 
The use of military force is prohibited in the Charter as it was mentioned 
before. Yet, the Charter assigns the Security Council as the main body to authorize 
the use of force under Chapter VII when the Council deems necessary in case of 
determining a threat to the international peace and security. The Congo case (1960-
1964, ONUC) is an example from Cold War in which the UN intervened in an 
intrastate conflict under Chapter VII. The complex features of post-Cold War
194
 
conflicts have introduced a dramatic increase in the number of such operations; but 
mainly on the humanitarian grounds unlike the Congo case. Some prominent 
examples of such UN operations the mandates of which were authorized under 
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Chapter VII are the cases of Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo (after the end 
of 1999 NATO operation) and the most recently Darfur. 
 For an effective use of force under Chapter VII, there are three conditions for 
the Security Council to meet.
195
 First, none of the permanent members of the Council 
is to veto the decision. There are not clearly set conditions under which one of the P-
5 uses veto; rather it is experienced on a “case-by-case” basis.196 Second, political 
objectives of the operations are to be clearly and consistently identified. It was the 
case for Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti; however, not in Bosnia, Rwanda or 
Somalia where the UN missions were evaluated to be failure.
197
 Third, the Council is 
to have access to the sufficient military forces as provided in Article 43.
198
 However, 
it is not the case in practice and the UN depends on the willingness of its members to 
provide troops for operations. The United States is considered to be the key in that 
sense that “it alone has the firepower, transport, command and control, 
communications, intelligence, logistics, and power projection capabilities needed for 
large-scale operations.”199 The fact that Weiss gives as example shows the 
dependency on the willingness of the US for sources:
200”The UN‟s peacekeeping 
budget alone amounted to $5 billion in 2006; (...) the equivalent of only one month 
of US expenditures in Iraq.” 
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3.1.3.2. Peacekeeping Operations 
The peacekeeping activities of the UN are not referred in the Charter and are 
expressed by Hammarskjöld to constitute “Chapter six and a half”201; somewhere in 
between “traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as negotiation 
and mediation under Chapter VI, and more forceful action as authorized under 
Chapter VII.”202  
The peacekeeping in traditional sense was born in 1956 with the deployment 
of UNEF I to calm the Suez Crisis.
203
 This mission succeeded to fulfill its mandate to 
a great extent and the organizing principles of that operation turned out to be the 
guiding principles of traditional peacekeeping.
204
 These are “consent”, “impartiality” 
and “minimum use of force”-“non-use of force except self-defense” in other words- 
consisting the “holy trinity” of traditional peacekeeping.205 Until 1987, such 
operations usually served two functions: observing the peace through monitoring 
cease-fires and keeping the peace through “providing an interpositional buffer 
between belligerents”;206 and were usually deployed in inter-state conflicts. During 
the Cold War, there are four cases out of thirteen in which peacekeeping forces were 
deployed in internal conflicts: the Congo(1960-1964, ONUC), Cyprus(1964-present, 
UNFICYP), Lebanon(1958, UNOGIL) and Yemen(1963-1964, UNYOM).
207
 
However, the primary aim in intervening in those conflicts was to prevent a 
                     
201
 Thomas G. Weiss, D. P. Forsythe, and R. A. Coate. 1997. The United Nations and Changing World 
Politics. Boulder, Co.: Westview, p. 48. 
202
 UN Peacekeeping. Official Website. Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ (accessed in 
March, 2010).  
203
 Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and S. Griffin. 2004. Understanding Peacekeeping. Cambridge: 
Polity Press, p. 71. 
204
 Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, pp. 99-106. 
205
 Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, p. 96. 
206
 Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, p. 49. 
207
 Oudraat, p. 505 and DPKO. “List of Operations 1948-2009.” Available at 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/list.shtml (accessed in March, 2010). 
 46 
 
superpower confrontation from emerging, not to “keep hostilities from breaking out 
again locally”208 or to reduce humanitarian sufferings. 
In the post-Cold War era, the nature of conflicts has dramatically changed and 
shifted from inter-state level to intra-state. In addition, the Cold War fact that the 
Security Council was paralyzed to make decisions due to the US-Soviet tension 
disappeared. These two developments have increased the role of the UN to intervene 
in world affairs and as Weiss noted “many people saw the end of the Cold War as 
leading to the rebirth of the United Nations.”209 The UN has undertaken fifty 
peacekeeping operations from 1988 on, almost four times of the number of the 
operations conducted during the whole Cold War.
210
  
Twenty of post-Cold War operations took place between 1988 and 1993. The 
budget devoted to UN peacekeeping increased from “US$230 million in 1988, to 
between US$800 million and US$1.6 billion throughout the 1990s.”211 The reasons 
of this sudden increase in number of peacekeeping operations and the keen on to 
participate by states are classified as “general” and “specific” reasons by Bellamy. 
He makes four “general” explanations.212 First, the fall of communism in Eastern 
Europe diminished the ideological confrontation and brought potential for 
international cooperation. Second is as mentioned above that the dissolution of 
Soviet bloc led the way to a much more permissive Security Council. Third, the 
process of globalization disturbed publics and increased “international awareness” to 
humanitarian catastrophe through „CNN effect‟ that “the television images of human 
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suffering beamed into the living rooms of liberal societies.”213 Last factor considers 
the end of possibility of proxy wars between two superpowers. On the other hand, 
Bellamy links the “specific” reasons to normative ideas referring to “good 
international citizenship” idea of Linklater.214 So to say, the UN peacekeeping has 
been going through qualitative, quantitative and normative changes in the new era.
215
    
 However, it has been challenging for UN peacekeeping which is “originally 
developed as a means of dealing with inter-state conflict” to be “increasingly applied 
to intrastate conflicts and civil wars.”216 As a result, severe problems occurred and 
led the UN operations to traumatic failures in Somalia(1993), Rwanda(1994) and 
Bosnia(1995) causing a retreat from peacekeeping from mid to end of the 1990s. 
These problems were primarily about political will, funding, institutional capacity 
and practical competence.
217
 Bellamy summarizes these problems as below: 
Political will: Member states lacked the political will to match their rhetorical 
commitments with intellectual and material resources. As a result, 
participants in new peacekeeping operations were often poorly equipped and 
attempted to apply old techniques to very different circumstances. 
 
Funding: ...the UN did not receive the funds it needed to fulfill the mandates 
authorized by the Security Council.  
 
Institutional capacity: (...) Planning for peacekeeping operations remained 
divided between several departments, little systematic cooperation took place 
between the different UN agencies, and there was little coordination between 
the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop-contributing states. 
 
Practical competence: Since the UN had expunged the memory of the Congo 
mission in the 1960s, there was no pool of practical expertise and experience 
on which the organization could draw. (...) ...military and civilian contingents 
differed greatly in their equipment, doctrine, training, rules of engagement 
and funding.    
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 In short, states got reluctant to involve in peacekeeping operations till the end 
of the 1990s while the UN has been in effort to learn lessons from its failures. In 
1999, the crisis in Kosovo and unauthorized NATO operation there accelerated the 
„intervening in intrastate affairs with humanitarian grounds‟ debate; and also the 
rebirth of peacekeeping, which was observed with the deployment of four new UN 
operations just within one year.
218
 All these developments together with lessons of 
the past led the UN to attempt to reform itself. This issue is touched upon in a more 
detailed way in “The UN and Humanitarian Interventions” part of this study.  
 
3.1.3.3. Relationship between the Use of Force and Peacekeeping 
  
 The use of force in internal conflicts – namely „peace enforcement‟ – and 
peacekeeping activities are considered to be different in nature. Indeed, they are. 
However, such a differentiation depends on the context whether the word 
„peacekeeping‟ is handled from a narrow or a broader perspective. In its narrower 
context, peacekeeping activities are consent-based, impartial operations with 
minimum use of force, while peace enforcement missions are coercion-based and 
combat activities. On the other hand, in its broader context, „peacekeeping‟ is a 
general word for peace operations which is the sum of the activities undertaken 
through the requirements of different conflicts. That broader understanding makes 
peacekeeping cover peace enforcement as one of its types, which are five according 
to Bellamy‟s classification: traditional peacekeeping, managing transition; wider 
peacekeeping; peace enforcement; peace-support operations.
219
        
 Even when considered in its narrow sense, the distinction between 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement is blurred in contemporary politics. Report of 
High-Level Panel of 2004 states that a Chapter VII mandate becomes the usual 
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practice for both peacekeeping and peace enforcement cases because of the fact that 
“...even the most benign environment turn sour – when spoilers emerge to undermine 
a peace agreement and put civilians at risk – and that it is desirable for there to be 
complete certainty about the mission‟s capacity to respond with force, if 
necessary.”220  
 Indeed, since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new intrastate 
conflicts with complex nature, the UN has been trying to regulate its peacekeeping 
and to place the traditional principles. Such reports are recorded to be moving forth 
and back depending on the changing conditions and the results of operations. In the 
following, these reports and the way they regard the issue are mentioned 
chronologically. 
 An Agenda for Peace was prepared by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali in 1992 to take the attention to the changing context; and in addition to draw 
general frameworks for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping in the 
new era. The report observed that “the established principles and practices of 
peacekeeping have responded flexibly to new demands of recent years.”221 In 
addition, Ghali defined the peacekeeping operations to be deployed hitherto with the 
concent of the parties to the conflict.
222
 Phrases flexibility and hitherto signalled the 
downward trend for the classical principles of the peacekeeping for the emerging era. 
 Moreover, in An Agenda for Peace, Ghali expressed his expectation to see the 
renewal of the UN after the Cold War be completed by 1995, its Fiftieth 
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Anniversary.
223
 However, the three years between brought failure and confusion for 
the UN leading a retreat from peacekeeping for a while. This was reflected in 
Supplement to An Agenda for Peace of 1995. The report confirmed that “respect for 
certain basic principles of peacekeeping are essential to its success”224 That position 
meant a step backwards from what was provided in An Agenda for Peace. 
 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations – known as 
“Brahimi Report” – was presented in 2000. The Report aimed to produce a review of 
the UN peace operations and to offer frank, specific, and realistic recommendations 
“for reform of a system with the scope and complexity of United Nations peace 
operations”.225 Released after a half-decade retreat, this Report has been welcomed 
and interpreted as the attempt of the UN to reborn from its ashes. An in depth 
analysis of peace operations have been provided through the Report over the issues 
of doctrine, strategy and decision-making for peace operations; United Nations 
capacities to deploy operations rapidly and effectively; Headquarters resources and 
structure for planning and supporting peacekeeping operations; peace operations 
and the information age.  
 As for the peacekeeping operations, the Panel coincides that consent, 
impartiality and use of force only in self-defence should remain as the main 
principles of peacekeeping.
226
 However, these principles are conceptualized 
considering the context of intrastate and transnational conflicts. The Report warns 
that local parties may manipulate consent through giving it to gain time and 
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withdrawing when the operation turns against their interests.
227
 As another principle, 
impartiality is handled with cautiousness. It is argued that “no failure did more to 
damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s 
than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor.”228 The images of Rwanda 
Genocide have haunted the Panel to comment so. Therefore, impartiality is taken as 
commitment to Charter principles; not as neutrality or as treating all parties equally 
no matter what.
229
 It is related to the Report‟s view about the use of force. It is 
argued that the operations should be able to constitute a deterrent threat against 
spoilers unlike the “symbolic” and “non-threatening” forces of traditional 
peacekeeping operations. Therefore the mandates should be authorized to use force 
through “better equipped and more costly” bigger forces.230 These conceptualizations 
about the principles concern to make UN peacekeeping operations able to “carry out 
their mandates professionally and successfully” once deployed.231 
 United Nations‟ attempts to regulate the basis of its peacekeeping have 
continued following Brahimi Report. The last document to be examined is United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines of 2008, known as 
“Capstone Doctrine”. This document is the most recent one and places itself “at the 
highest-level of the current doctrine framework” for UN peacekeeping.232 Moreover, 
it necessitates conformity for “any subordinate directives, guidelines, standard of 
operating procedures, manuals and training materials issued by DPKO/DFS” to the 
principles and concepts set in this document.
233
 Therefore, there seems to be no 
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deviation from accepting the traditional principles of peacekeeping as guiding 
principles for contemporary operations; as Capstone Doctrine listed consent, 
impartiality and non-use of force except self-defence and defence of the mandate as 
the basic principles.
234
 The paper emphasizes the importance of getting consent of 
local parties; however, it also states that “a peacekeeping operation must have the 
political will and analytical skills, the operational resources, and the will to manage 
situations where there is an absence or breakdown of local consent” which may 
necessitate the use of force in some cases as last resort.
235
 For impartiality, the 
document repeats what Brahimi Report has provided. The position of UN 
peacekeeping is considered as “a good referee” who is impartial but penalizes 
“infractions”.236 As for non-use of force principle, the document states that UN 
peacekeeping operations should be “robust” and authorized to “use all necessary 
means” for deterrence in situations where “militias, criminal gangs, and other 
spoilers” constitute a threat to civilians or the mandate.237 However, it is strictly 
mentioned that “robust peacekeeping” is not the same with “peace enforcement”. 
Because, the latter does not necessitate the consent of the parties and use military 
force at strategic level.
238
 
 To conclude, the UN peace operations tend to use force in its interventions, 
albeit as a last resort.   
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3.2. The UN and Humanitarian Interventions 
 
       3.2.1. Definition of Humanitarian Intervention 
 
 “Humanitarian intervention” is a very controversial concept in international 
relations. Indeed, the word “intervention”, which has been examined above, is what 
makes the concept so problematic. Therefore, the complete definition of 
“humanitarian intervention” is debatable and depends on whether it is made by a 
supporter or a critique of the doctrine; or whether the concept is perceived from 
classical or novel points. From the literature, two similar definitions of Holzgrefe and 
Murphy work for the context of this study. They state that humanitarian intervention 
is 
...the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) 
aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the 
fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without 
the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.
239
 
 
...the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international 
organization primarily for the purpose of protecting nationals of the target 
state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human 
rights.
240
 
 
As it is understood from both definitions, the threat or use of economic, 
diplomatic or other sanctions and the forcible interventions aimed at rescuing the 
intervening state‟s own nationals are not concluded to the sole term humanitarian 
intervention. Apart from this, the definitions seem to be parallel that both consider 
the use of military means, the role of same bodies as actors, identical purposes, etc. 
However, a similar phrase meeting the phrase “without the permission of the state 
within whose territory force is applied” of Holzgrefe‟s definition is missing in 
Murphy‟s. That difference is related to their attitudes towards the role of “consent” 
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or authorization of the intervened state. Murphy argues that the lack of consent of the 
target state is an important characteristic of the “threat or use of force”; otherwise the 
situation resembles military cooperation.
241
 However, he explains, placing the issue 
of authorization at the center also introduces “undesirable ambiguities about what 
constitutes „humanitarian interventions‟.”242 Furthermore, he argues that the issue of 
the consent of the target state plays the central role in “assessing whether the 
humanitarian intervention should be regarded as permissible or lawful” rather than in 
defining the term.
243
  
Whether the phrase of „the lack of permission from the target state‟ should be 
included in the definition or not is also a matter for this paper. Murphy‟s explanation 
is feasible that such an inclusion may lead confusion while analyzing and entitling 
some UN operations which are initialized on humanitarian grounds. That is to say 
that consent would complicate the issue even further as there are different forms of 
consent and consent at different levels. Therefore, the main definition of 
„humanitarian intervention‟ for this study is the one that Murphy has formulated by 
not giving the issue of consent a central role. 
 
       3.2.2. Ethical Framework: The Duty to Intervene 
 
 Whether sovereign states have a „duty‟ to intervene in cases in which human 
sufferings occur is a hot debate in contemporary politics. The idea depends on the 
moral case for intervention that the states are not only permitted but also morally 
obliged to do so.
244
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The idea has its origins from the 17th century. At that time, Hugo Grotius 
constructed his understanding of law on the basis that states should act for the benefit 
of their “actual subject” which is individual human being. Otherwise, it would be 
lawful even to wage a war against a state to prevent it from “maltreating” its own 
nationals.
245
 Three centuries later, the idea has been extended by scholars like 
Micheal Walzer that individuals should be provided not only the rights but a “space” 
to exercise such rights; therefore, sovereignty should be considered as an 
instrumental moral “good” to provide this space.246 In addition, when the issue is 
considered within the “just war” framework, it is argued that humanitarian 
intervention is as just as “self-defence”; therefore, sovereign rights of a state cannot 
be put forward against intervention when that state violates the rights of its own 
people.
247
 Such a framework has led to the question whether other states are just 
permitted or also obligated to intervene in such circumstances.
248
 
To argue that intervention is morally obligatory as a duty is a stronger claim 
than “morally permissible”. It leads to conclude that it would be “impermissible” not 
to intervene to protect the innocent people from the violence of the state of their 
own.
249
 The analogy created by Joel Feinberg in 1970 supports that strong claim of 
the duty to protect. Feinberg argues that when a swimmer is drowning off a beach 
with no lifeguard and there is a group of people witnessing that incident as 
bystanders, then “‟everyone should use his eyes and his common sense and cooperate 
as best as he can.‟” Moreover, he argues, “‟if no one makes any motion at all, it 
follows that no one has done his best within the limits imposed by the situation, and 
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all are subject at least to blame.‟”250 In short, he argues that anyone in the crowd has 
a moral obligation to do something; even a nonswimmer to contribute through own 
abilities in necessary terms. 
The issue is complicated for the United Nations, which is an organization 
composed of sovereign nation states and which is the primary organ to authorize 
intervention. It was founded in 1945, just after the Holocaust, and strongly 
emphasized for the respect for human rights in its Charter. From the foundation on, it 
has dealt with the promotion of human rights through declarations, covenants, and 
treaties; in addition provided some restrictions on states. For instance, with the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, the 
obligation to intervene in genocidal situations has been accepted as a rule, which 
necessitates the abolition of the principle of nonintervention for extreme cases of 
crime against humanity and man-made atrocities.
251
 Article VIII of Convention calls 
for action through appropriate means to “prevent” and “suppress” the acts of 
genocide.
252
 
Although the Cold War dynamics attributed humanitarian issues the 
secondary place in rank of importance, the end of the Cold War has initiated a hot 
debate over the incomplete and inefficient response of the international community 
to ethnic conflicts and genocidal cases like Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda.
253
 At the end 
of the decade, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked: “If humanitarian 
intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we 
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systemic violations of human 
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rights?”254 So to say, the new century has come up with the reform process of the UN 
and the evolution of an international norm; the responsibility to protect.  
  “The responsibility to protect” idea is developed by a Canadian-sponsored 
group; The Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The main idea 
depends on the „duty‟ to protect understanding and considers state sovereignty as a 
responsibility.
255
 The main argument of the idea is “the idea that sovereign states 
have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from 
mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when are unwilling to do so, that 
responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.”256 
 The idea is included to the UN reform debate through the High-Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change report in December 2004. That report claims that 
there is an „emerging norm of a collective international responsibility to protect‟ 
which includes both the „right to intervene‟ and the „responsibility to protect‟ of any 
state to act against „avoidable catastrophe‟.257 More significantly, in September 2005 
World Summit of the UN, world leaders agreed, for the first time, that states have a 
primary responsibility to protect their own populations; and the international 
community has a responsibility to act when these governments fail to protect the 
most vulnerable among us. It has been some way of legalizing the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention on ethical grounds. 
 
       3.2.3. Legal Framework: The Right to Intervene 
 
 Humanitarian intervention has no formal legal definition. However, it has 
strong legal claims based on both the UN Charter and other sources of international 
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law. As “the paramount international convention governing the exercise of armed 
force in the international community is the Charter of the United Nations”258, both 
advocates and critiques of justice of humanitarian intervention doctrine try to support 
their stance via the United Nations Charter first.  
 As it was mentioned before, Article 2(4) on prohibition of the use of force 
and Article 2(7) on the inviolability of state sovereignty are the main Charter 
provisions set against humanitarian interventions. Supporters of the legality of the 
doctrine argue that such interventions do not constitute a threat to the territorial 
integrity or political independence of the state, rather forces the state “to observe 
fundamental international norms of human rights.”259 As for Article 2(7), supporters 
argue that intervening on humanitarian grounds is not indeed an interference to 
domestic jurisdiction “once the state has ratified international treaties governing such 
rights”, on the contrary it is an international obligation.260 Furthermore, the 
supporters argue that severe violations of human rights may cause a spill-over effect 
and threatens international peace and security which necessitates an action as 
provided in Chapter VII.
261
 As another legal base from the Charter, the supporters 
rely on the Preamble and related Articles emphasizing respect for human rights. 
 On the other hand, the doctrine is said to derive legal basis from customary 
international law and treaties ratified by states. Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes of 
Genocide (1948), Helsinki Accords, covenants are examples of documents 
internationalizing the human rights
262
 as well as reports and papers prepared by the 
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UN. The Report of High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change can be 
given as example which provides: “The principle of non-intervention in internal 
affairs cannot be used to protect genocidal acts (...)or large-scale violations of 
international humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic cleansing.”263 
 Besides the question about the right to intervene, another problematic legal 
question is who is to intervene. There had been a number of unilateral interventions 
with humanitarian justifications during the Cold War. The practices in post-Cold 
War era indicate both unilateral and multilateral interventions with or without the 
authorization of the Security Council, as well. ECOWAS intervention in Liberia 
(1990), the establishment and enforcement of no-fly zones in northern Iraq (1991), 
ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone (1997), and NATO‟s operation in Kosovo 
(1999) are some examples from post-Cold War era in that sense. The legality of these 
action have not been proven. However, they rely on the grounds of „legitimacy‟.  
 Report of High-Level Panel lists five basic criteria of legitimacy for the 
Security Council to address.
264
 They consider the seriousness of threat; whether the 
proposed military action has a proper purpose; if military means is the option as last 
resort; whether military action proposed has proportional means; and as last 
considers the balance of consequences whether the action is likely to do more good 
than harm. 
   However, being legitimate does not mean for an action to be legal. 
Secretary-General Report on the Work of the Organization in 1999 emhasized the 
role of Security Council as the only authority to decide the use of force stating: 
“What is clear is that enforcement action without Security Council authorization 
threatens the very core of the international security system founded on the Charter of 
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the UN. Only the Charter provides a universally accepted legal basis for the use of 
force.”265  
 Then it can be asked what the driving force is for the Security Council to 
authorize the intervention. 
 
3.3. Deciding to Intervene 
 
 The United Nations has been criticized widely on the ground that it acts 
“selectively” while choosing the cases to intervene. The Brahimi Report defends the 
Organization arguing “there are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping 
forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go.”266 
However, it does not mention clearly under which conditions the Security Council 
decides to intervene in an internal conflict. The following sentence of the Report 
gives a clue about this question stating that “...when the United Nations does send its 
forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of 
war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them.”267 Eight years 
later with Capstone Doctrine, which factors may be taken into account by the 
Security Council while deciding to intervene are listed.
268
 There are six factors in this 
list.  
First, it is considered if the situation is likely to turn into a threat to 
international peace and security. The second is about the existence of regional or 
sub-regional organizations and arrangements to reinforce the UN. The third deals 
with the existence of a cease-fire and the commitment of the parties to peace process. 
The fourth factor asks whether there is a “clear political goal” which can be 
“reflected in the mandate.” The fifth factor considers the possibility of a precise 
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mandate for a UN operation to be formulated. Finally, the ensurance of “the safety 
and security of the UN personnel” is concerned. 
In short, it can be extracted both from the statement in Brahimi Report and 
the factors listed above that the main condition for a UN involvement in an internal 
conflict is the possibility to get satisfying results. The probability for this is higher 
through launching an effective operation, which requires a combination of military 
means and political will.
269
  
 It is a fact that the UN has no standing army. Article 43 of the Charter 
provides the existence of military forces that the Security Council may call upon for 
the maintenance of international peace and security; however, the Council lacks 
those forces in reality.
270
 That makes the operations bound to the willingness of the 
members to provide troops when necessary.  
 In analyzing the role of the willingness of the members to involve in an 
internal conflict, Oudraat classifies the main factors as two:
271
 
1.”...the extent to which the interests of one or more members of the P-5272 
are engaged;” 
2.”...the extent to which the conflict in question poses a threat to international 
peace and security.”  
 
 The first point he makes is widely accepted in the literature. For example, 
Miller wrote for intrastate interventions in Cold War conditions as the „„conditions 
under which the UN expresses its concerns in cases of domestic strife and the means 
by which it responds to these disorders are determined by the interplay of national 
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and international interests and influences.‟‟273 Schacter, as well, wrote the impact of 
“the interests and positions of the great powers”274 on the top of his list. As an 
example from more recent scholars, Laura Neack goes further and argues that “states 
become involved in UN peace-keeping mainly to serve their own national 
interests.”275 On the other hand, authors like Martha Finnemore argues that in 
contemporary era, even when states acted conventionally and ignored ethics as they 
did in Rwanda case, they acknowledge that they have had “not just a right but a duty 
to intervene” in humanitarian crisis like genocide; and therefore, they felt obliged to 
fix their misbehaviours.
276
  
Turning back to Oudraat‟s own concerns about the engagement of interests, 
five matters can be listed as on the ground of which the members tend to give the 
decision to intervene in internal conflicts
277
 
1. when the conflict occurs “on” or “near” the territory of a P-5 member; 
2. when the region of the conflict has strategic or economic importance; 
3. when the conflict “threatens or involves a former ally”; 
4. when a party to the conflict is closely tied to one of the members with 
historical, ideological or political ties; 
5. when the decision to involve is not in conflict with the domestic politics of 
the member and with calculations about “costs, benefits and risks.”  
 
One of the assumptions of Regan can be tied to the last point; he argues the 
“internal process” in the intervening country is effective in decision making to 
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involve in the conflict.
278
 He also adds for an ongoing conflict that “the greater its 
intensity, the less likely will be outside interventions.”279  
Considering post 9/11 period, 2 additional notes can be attached to that list. 
First, the role of new strategic concerns leading to the change in priorities of the 
states should be mentioned. With the announcement of the “war on terror”, new 
“strategic priorities” of terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and „rogue states‟ have 
been introduced.
280
 Secondly, the scepticism of international community about the 
West‟s humanitarian interventionism has increased especially after the invasion of 
Iraq with humanitarian context as one of the justifying grounds.
281
  
 As mentioned above, the second point Oudraat makes considers whether the 
internal conflict poses a threat to international peace and security. He emphasizes 
three prospects to intervene
282
  
1. when an internal conflict is not contained within its territory and sprang to 
neighbouring states and risks the regional security; 
2. when an internal conflict “threaten(s) access to strategic resources such as 
oil” or takes place in a strategic part of the world; 
3. when an internal conflict constitutes serious violations of “international 
humanitarian law”.  
 
Upon those classifications, the likelihood of UN action can be visualized with 
a matrix.
283
  
 
 
 
 
                     
278
 Patrick M. Regan. 1998. “Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts,” 
Journal of Politics 60(3), p. 759. 
279
 Regan, pp. 766-775. 
280
 Gompert and et al., p. 430. 
281
 Paul Williams and Alex Bellamy. 2005. “The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur,” 
Security Dialogue 36(1), p. 36. 
282
 Oudraat, p. 518. 
283
 Oudraat, p. 519. 
 
P-5 Interests 
Internal Conflict 
Contained Not Contained 
Yes 3 1 
No 4 2 
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Kofi Annan‟s words summarizes this part and introduces the next 
emphasizing the importance of the willingness. He argues, “...the success or failure 
of peacekeeping operations derives above all from the will of the parties to the 
conflict, of the Security Council, and of other Member States to use this invaluable 
instrument wisely and well.”284   
 
3.4. Evaluating the Success of the Operations  
 
 Success is a very relative concept both to define and to measure. Therefore 
there is not a consensus among scholars over the question when a mission can be 
evaluated as successful.  
One of the initiatives to overcome this problem came from The National 
Research Council‟s Committee on International Conflict Resolution. Five academics 
who previously conducted research on “success” issue – P.F. Diehl, W.J. Durch, 
A.B. Fetherston, R.C. Johansen, S.R. Ratner, were asked to address main points 
related to the subject. As a result, their work has been reviewed, analyzed and 
compared to each other.285  
Diehl mentions a number of criteria for assessing the success. Shortly, a 
mission can be considered as successful when the purpose of the mission in the 
mandate is fulfilled, when the mission achieves to provide nutrition, medical care 
and cease-fires, and when the impact of the operation on the local population is 
positive.  
Durch thinks that it is difficult to formulate generic measures to success as 
each mandate has its unique characteristics. However, at some points he seems to 
agree with Diehl. He generally assesses success in terms of contribution of the 
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operation to the containment of conflict and the root causes; and in terms of the 
fulfillment of operational tasks effectively as formulated in the mandate.  
Ratner, agreeing with Diehl and Durch, makes an evaluation according to the 
usefulness for the host states in terms of time horizon; and the usefulness for the 
intervening organization in terms of “opportunity cost”.  
Druckman and Stern analyzes the approaches of Johansen and Fetherston to 
be different than the previous ones as they tend to think that operations should 
contribute to larger values rather than to the self-interests of national governments 
and militaries. Those larger values are “world peace, justice, and the reduction of 
human suffering” for Johansen; and Fetherston makes reference for these values to 
“the needs of people who live war-torn societies.” 
As a more recent work of 2007, Seybolt argues that the success of a 
humanitarian military intervention can be evaluated through the lives it saves.
286
 To 
explain the argument in more specific, the author goes on “if in a humanitarian crisis 
some people would have died without assistance, but did not die because of the 
actions of the military personnel, the intervention succeeded.”287  
The studies that have been examined so far seems to take the issue from a 
one-sided narrower understanding. A broader one can be found in the study of Darya 
Pushkina who argues to take “both aspects of success” into consideration that are 
“completion of the mandate to address the political issues” and “the mission‟s 
contribution to the UN‟s broader goals of international security and reduction of 
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human suffering.”288 Moreover, the author makes a list of four criteria to assess 
success
289
 which are also applicable for the evaluation in this study: 
Criteron 1: Limiting violent conflict in the host state is the primary goal of         
peacekeeping. (...) This is particularly challenging task in intrastate conflicts 
(...) This criterion is applied by analysing whether a mission succeeded in 
curbing large-scale violence, sustaining ceasefire agreements, reducing the 
number of conflict-related casualties and supervising demobilization, and by 
assessing the progress of disarmament. 
 
 
Criteron 2: Reduction of human suffering is another primary goal of 
peacekeeping missions. (...) This criteron is operationalized by estimating the 
extent of any reduction in human rights abuses and the mission‟s success in 
resettling refugees. 
 
Criteron 3: Preventing the spread of conflict beyond the object state‟s borders 
is also important for ensuring regional security. (...) [The criteron is evaluated 
to] the extent to which the integrity of neighbouring countries has been kept 
intact. 
 
Criteron 4: Promoting conflict resolution is a final measure of the 
effectiveness of the UN mission. (...) This criteron will thus be assessed 
according to the extent to which the environment fostered by peacekeepers 
inhibits further violence. 
 
The fact is that, the operation in Darfur is continuing; and it is difficult to 
measure these criteria to evaluate the success of a mission which has not been 
completed yet. However, such a measurement is still beneficial to understand the 
dynamics and capabilities of the ongoing operation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE UN INTERVENTION IN DARFUR CRISIS:  
UNAMID 
 
 
  Considering military action as an option to respond to Darfur crisis was 
pronounced even before the SC mentioned the situation officially. For instance, in 
his Rwandan anniversary speech on 7 April 2004, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
pointed out the issue and said that:
290
 
Whatever the term it uses to describe the situation, the international 
community cannot stand idle. (...) The international community must be 
prepared to take swift and appropriate action. By “action” in such situations I 
mean a continuum of steps which may include military action. 
 
However, busy with the Naivasha Peace Process to resolve the North-South 
conflict, and considering different positions of its members on responding the Darfur 
crisis, the SC did not regard sending peacekeepers as an option until August 2006. In 
this chapter, the UN intervention in Darfur is analyzed mainly concentrating on the 
decision-making for a military intervention and the attitudes of the states involved. 
Following, this chapter attempts to explain the basics of the African Union/United 
Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UNAMID, focusing on the functional, 
organizational and financial aspects. 
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4.1. Launching the Operation 
        4.1.1. The UNSC Resolutions 
 The SC referred to the situation in Darfur for the first time with Resolution 
1547 on 11 June 2004, sixteen months after the outbreak of the crisis. The essence of 
this resolution was directly related to the North and South peace. It pointed out the 
situation in Darfur with one paragraph calling for “an immediate halt to the fighting 
in the Darfur region” and welcoming African Union‟s mediating efforts.291 However, 
there was no mention of a UN involvement. On the contrary, in the SC meeting, 
there were signals that the issue would be out of agenda for a while. For example, 
Pakistan, one of the non-permanent members of the Council at that period, stated 
that:
292
 
The Sudan is an important member of the African Union, the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference and the United Nations. As a United Nations Member 
State, the Sudan has all the rights and priviledges incumbent under the United 
Nations Charter, including to sovereignty, political independence, unity and 
territorial integrity. 
 
In addition, the representative of the United Kingdom affirmed that the 
Sudanese government was “responsible throughout the country for the well-being of 
its citizens” and its efforts ought to be reinforced.293 Alex Bellamy comments on the 
attitude of the members that “Pakistan, China and Russia believed that the scale of 
humanitarian suffering in Darfur was insufficient to provoke serious reflection on 
whether Sudan was fulfilling its responsibilities to its citizens”.294 Moreover, he 
continued, the United States, the UK and France were reluctant to do more at that 
time.
295
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The first SC resolution directly concerning the Darfur issue came on 30 July 
2004 with Resolution 1556. The resolution condemned all acts of human rights 
violations by the parties to the conflict, especially by the Janjaweed.
296
 Moreover, the 
SC determined that the situation in Darfur constituted “a threat to international peace 
and security and to stability in the region”.297 Acting under Chapter VII, Resolution 
1556 demanded the Sudanese government to disarm the Janjaweed militias in thirty-
day time, threatened it with sanctions,
298
 and imposed an arms embargo on the 
region
299
. That resolution was adopted with two countries abstaining: China and 
Pakistan. China reiterated its position that it believed the Sudanese government was 
the primarily responsible body to resolve the Darfur issue. The Chinese 
representative continued that Resolution 1556 would provide “mandatory measures” 
against the government of Sudan and would further complicate the situation.
300
  
The provisions and the implementation of the resolution led to different 
interpretations. For some, the resolution could not go “far enough”.301 Alex de Waal 
argued that the SC could not monitor “the implementation of its demand.”302 
Likewise, the spokesperson of Amnesty International suggested that Resolution 1556 
showed “the abandonment of the people of Darfur and an abdication of the Security 
Council‟s role as a human rights enforcing agent”.303 However, for others, the SC 
was too harsh against Sudan in threatening with sanctions.
304
 The objections to the 
sanctions were mainly on two grounds: the principle and/or economic interests. As 
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for Pakistan, imposement of sanctions would violate the sovereignty principle.
305
 On 
the same ground, the Arab League stated its position as being against the sanctions 
“in any circumstances”.306 On the other hand, China and Russia opposed sanctions 
both in principle, and on the ground that the sanctions would violate their 
commercial relationships with Sudan.
307
 Even the UK informally stated its worries 
that the sanctions could undermine the peace process in Darfur.
308
 As a result, 
although it was apparent that the government of Sudan could not fulfill the demands 
of Resolution 1556, the SC could not find it in breach of its decisions in the 
following Resolution 1564.
309
 Rather, this resolution repeated the threat of sanctions 
unless the Sudanese government would fully cooperate with the SC decisions.
310
            
The timing of Resolution 1564 was important. It was adopted on 18 
September 2004, a short while after the “G-word” was pronounced for the situation 
in Darfur by the US Secretary of State Colin Powell on 9 September 2004. The 
resolution first reaffirmed its commitment to the “sovereignty, unity, territorial 
integrity, and independence of Sudan”311, and recalled that the government had “the 
primary responsibility to protect its population within its territory”.312 Then it 
requested the establishment of an international commission of inquiry to investigate 
and report whether “acts of genocide” had occurred in Darfur.313 Indeed, the AU had 
proposed the establishment of a similar commission earlier than Resolution 1564. 
However, it had been rejected by Khartoum then.
314
 This time, The Commission of 
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Inquiry on Darfur was established which would publish a report on 25 January 2005 
concluding that the government of Sudan had not pursued “a policy of genocide”.315 
The Commission would state that “the crucial element of genocidal intent appears to 
be missing, at least as far as the central Government authorities are concerned”.316 
Yet, the report would approve the conduct of widespread and systematic violence 
upon civilians stating that “the crimes against humanity and war crimes that have 
been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide”.317 In 
addition, the Commission would submit the names of fifty-one individuals for 
“criminal investigation”.318 This development would pave the way for the SC to refer 
the case to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in 2005.
319
   
In the voting of Resolution 1564, four countries abstained: Algeria, China, 
Pakistan and Russian Federation. The reasons for opposition were similar to the ones 
for the previous resolution. Algeria stated that they had not expected “the Security 
Council to threaten the Sudanese government once again with recourse of 
sanctions”.320 Chinese representative reiterated that their position against sanctions 
remained “unchanged”.321 The delegate for Russia emphasized on the counter-
productivity of the possibility of sanctions, and reaffirmed that the main 
responsibility to halt the civilian suffering belonged to the Sudanese government.
322
 
Pakistan again stated its position as being against “the use, or the threat of use, of 
sanctions” stressing its respect for the “sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of 
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Sudan”.323 Apart from the sanctions issue, Algeria touched upon the decision to 
establish an international commission. The representative claimed that such an 
investigation would frustrate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the efforts 
of the AU to reach a political settlement.
324
 Upon those statements, Bellamy argues 
that the oppositions were “partly principled objections to sanctions, partly 
instrumental objections predicated on the view that the situation in Darfur was 
improving”.325 
 On the other hand, there were two countries, Romania and Philippines, which 
emphasized the responsibilities of the Security Council in such situations. Mr. Motoc 
of Romania argued that for the SC, it was the “political, legal and moral obligation to 
ring the alarm bell” and stated:326 
...in our twenty-first-century world, it should not be possible for the 
international community – for the Security Council in particular – to confine 
themselves to only taking a political look at events that involve tens of 
thousands victims of targeted violence, especially when we hear no denial of 
such tragic reported facts. There should be no moral hesitation in the Council 
in taking up its responsibilities.
327
  
 
 The attitude of the Philippines was in line with the responsibility to protect 
principle set forward by the ICISS. The representative repeated that “a state has the 
responsibility to protect its citizens”, and in case of that state‟s inability or 
unwillingness to do so, the SC would have “the moral and legal authority to enable 
that State to assume that responsibility”.328 
 It is interesting that although the US officially labeled the situation in Darfur 
as “genocide”, it did not argue for a more robust action. It did not even state the 
Council‟s responsibility to protect as Romania and the Philippines did. Indeed, the 
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US had two options. It could stand along a more activist line as it did for Kosovo and 
Iraq, or could act in consensus with the Council.
329
 The former option was not 
considered as politically feasible because of its “military overstretch” in those days. 
As a result, the US pursued a consensus with the majority of the Council which 
expressed “deep” scepticism “toward anything but AU interventionism”.330 
 Meanwhile, the conflict in South Sudan was about to come to an end. 
Eventually, the parties signed Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 9 January 
2005.
331
 Upon this development, on 25 March 2005, The SC adopted Resolution 
1590 which authorized the deployment of United Nations Mission in the Sudan 
(UNMIS) under Chapter VII, and decided to send 10,000 military personnel to the 
area.
332
 In the decision-making process, the Council was divided whether to deploy 
troops also in Darfur as one of the tasks of UNMIS.
333
 However, the discussions did 
not yield result. Instead, the SC requested Secretary-General to investigate and report 
how UNMIS could assist AMIS especially through “logistical support and technical 
assistance”.334        
Although the provisions of resolutions discussed above contributed to flex the 
restrictions on delivery of humanitarian assistance, they could not improve the 
situations of civilians in the region who were at risk and unprotected. Jan Egeland, 
the UN humanitarian chief complained that:
335
 
I feel as a humanitarian very strongly that the world keeps these people alive, 
we feed them, we clothe them, we give them shelter, we give them health 
care, but we don‟t protect them. And here is from my humanitarian 
perspective the big sort of challenge repeatedly missing, that you must have 
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some force there, that can really robustly protect the people and disarm all of 
these militias, and it‟s not there. 
 
 On the other hand, even though not operationalized, there was a debate going 
on throughout 2004-2006 about “the international military presence” in Darfur. Alex 
de Waal categorized the major issues focused on in this debate into four.
336
 First of 
all, the main concern was “whether the troops should be under AU or UN 
command”. It was an overwhelming view that the troops would have an African 
character. The second issue was the number of troops and their capabilities. As the 
AMIS force in the region was small and ill-equipped, the new mission would have to 
be “larger and be provided with more logistics and communications” in order to be 
more deterrent. Thirdly, the mandate of the mission was considered as a vital issue. 
De Waal noted that there was a consensus that “the mandate of ceasefire monitoring 
arising from the Ndjamena agreement was insufficient, and that the additional 
mandate that enabled AMIS to protect civilians who were at risk when it encountered 
them during the course of its duties was also inadequate”.337 The final major issue in 
the debate was the problem of funding. The contributors were aware that the existing 
AMIS forces needed financial support from the EU and the US. That revealed the 
inability of African countries to pay enough to conduct an operation. Therefore, a 
UN force would be more reliable as it would be “financed through mandatory 
assessed contributions” of the members.338 These four issues constituted the main 
framework of the debate which became useful when the SC finally regarded the 
military involvement as a serious option in mid-2006.  
 On 5 May 2006, Darfur Peace Agreement was signed by the Sudanese 
government and one faction of SLM/A rebel group. However, it was considered as a 
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flawed peace as the other faction of SLM/A and the other rebel group, the JEM, did 
not sign the document.
339
 Therefore, rather than achieving a sustainable political 
environment, the agreement frustrated the situation further. Within this context, the 
AU mediation was considered as biased by the Darfurians, and AMIS as a “failure” 
by the outside world.
340
 Upon those developments, the conditions for a UN takeover 
in the region were beginning to be ripe: AMIS was incompetent, the AU lacked 
credibility, and there was a strong “financial argument” for a UN operation. 
Moreover, there was a peace agreement on hand.
341
 However, the main obstacle was 
the reluctance of the Sudanese government to give its consent to a UN takeover. 
Eventually, on 31 August 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1706 and 
decided to expand the mandate of UNMIS to include Darfur “without prejudice to 
the mission‟s existing mandate and operations”.342 The resolution stated that UNMIS 
would be strengthened by “up to 17,300 military personnel and by an appropriate 
civilian component including up to 3,300 civilian police personnel and up to 16 
Formed Police Units”.343  
The consent of the Sudanese government was not in place when the SC 
adopted the resolution. In the voting, China, Russia and Qatar abstained mainly on 
that ground. The Chinese representative emphasized that China would support such a 
resolution only with the consent of the government of Sudan. Otherwise, he 
continued, the push for adoption of the resolution would “not help to stop further 
deterioration of the situation in Darfur”, on the contrary, it would “trigger further 
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misunderstanding and confrontation”.344 Likewise, Russian delegation explained that 
they did not have any objections in principle to the content of the resolution. Yet, 
they decided to abstain until the pending consent would be received.
345
 Lastly, Qatar 
stressed that they abstained because they believed such a resolution would affect the 
sovereignty of the Sudan.
346
 In addition, even the supportive members stressed the 
importance of the consent issue. For instance, the UK said it was not in dispute that 
the UN could not deploy in Darfur without the Sudanese consent.
347
 The Japanese 
representative reiterated that “it is extremely important that the consent and 
cooperation of the Government of the Sudan be assured”.348            
In the following period, Resolution 1706 could not be implemented due to the 
objection of the Sudanese regime to give consent for a UN takeover. The government 
declared that it would not allow “an Iraq-style occupation or foreign interference to 
weaken the regime”.349 President Bashir believed that “the consequences of refusing 
R 1706 are more advantageous than those of accepting it”.350 Moreover, it was stated 
in early October in a diplomatic note that “in the absence of Sudan‟s consent to the 
deployment of UN troops, any volunteering to provide peacekeeping troops to Darfur 
will be considered as a hostile act, a prelude to an invasion of a member country of 
the UN.”351 However, Sudan had to tone down after the reaction of the Council 
members to that note and Sudan‟s ambassador to Washington said that the note ought 
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to be considered as „null and void‟.352 Yet, the main position of the government did 
not change and UNMIS was not able to deploy to Darfur. 
The diplomatic efforts continued in order to find a common ground with the 
Sudan government. On 16 November 2006, the AU, the UN and the Sudanese 
government held a meeting in Addis Ababa and finally the consent was taken. The 
government of Sudan accepted the deployment of an unprecedented hybrid AU/UN 
peacekeeping operation in Darfur.
353
 However, the Sudanese government demanded 
that the force would have a pure African character. Upon talks, it was agreed that the 
peacekeeping force would have not a pure but a “predominantly” African character. 
So to say, when the African troops became unable to meet the necessary force 
requirements, “offers from other contributing states” would be considered after 
consulting the government of Sudan.
354
 In addition, they agreed to transfer the AMIS 
to the hybrid operation in three steps: light support package, heavy support package 
and full takeover.
355
 Upon these developments, on 31 July 2007, the SC unanimously 
adopted Resolution 1769 and authorized the establishment of African Union/United 
Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UNAMID, under Chapter VII.
356
 The SC 
decided that UNAMID would have 19,555 military personnel and approximately 
6,000 civilian components at its full strength,
357
 which would make it “the largest 
UN peacekeeping force in the world”.358  
UNAMID officially took the control from AMIS on 31 December 2007. 
From the establishment on, its mandate has been extended twice for twelve-months 
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periods with Resolutions 1828 and 1881. Therefore, until a third extension, 
UNAMID is to operate in the region up to 31 July 2010.
359
  
 
        4.1.2. Perspectives of the Actors Concerned 
 
 4.1.2.1. The USA 
 
 The USA position on Darfur was a very active one apparently. Compared to 
other African crisis, the situation caused the “largest and loudest American outcry” 
since the anti-Apartheid movement of two decades earlier.
360
 Hamilton and Hazlett 
argued that the main reasons for such grassroots response were the impact of the 
North-South conflict in Sudan and the memories of Rwandan genocide. They 
explained that:
361
    
Years of American activism for south Sudan, especially from the Christian 
Right, had generated allies in Congress. These legislators understood Darfur 
in light of the government of Sudan‟s past brutalities, and were willing to call 
the conflict what they believed it to be: genocide... [That] stimulated 
tremendous grassroots activism, especially among Jewish groups and on 
college campuses. Darfur also had the benefit of coming after the Rwandan 
genocide and the guilt it produced.  
 
 The activist groups launched a petition in June 2004 to pressure the Secretary 
of State to declare the situation as genocide.
362
 Eventually, Colin Powell did so in 
September, and the President Bush himself followed Powell.
363
 The declarations 
were made to satisfy the internal pressure groups, without calculating the 
international consequences of calling a crisis “genocide”. Therefore, the US started 
to pursue a foreign policy on Darfur which is full of “zigzags” afterwards.364 US 
Ambassador for the UN, John Bolton, prevented himself to pronounce the “G-word”, 
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and Under-Secretary of State for Africa declared that “Darfur was „not a genocide 
but a series of small attacks and incidents‟”.365 Yet, later, during the discussions on 
Resolution 1706, Ambassador Bolton used the word “genocide”.366 In short, the US 
policy was such incoherent that necessitates further analysis.  
 This indecisiveness was derived from three main reasons in general, as 
Mayroz identified.
367
 The first factor was the US‟s “war on terror” and Khartoum‟s 
cooperation on counter-terrorism.
368
 After 9/11 attacks, the US administration was in 
search for Arab allies and one of them became the Sudanese regime. The Sudanese 
Secret Service worked closely with the CIA and provided “key intelligence” to the 
US.
369
 Secondly, due to the strong domestic pressures by American Christian groups 
and African American leaders, the administration had devoted itself to settling the 
North-South conflict of Sudan and finalizing the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement.
370
 The Sudanese government was aware of the US dedication in its 
South conflict and played this card against a strong US involvement in Darfur.
371
 The 
third factor was related to the US presence in Iraq. The financial and military 
overstretch in Iraq made it unfeasible to intervene in another crisis militarily,
372
 
especially when there was no strategic interest in it.
373
 In addition, the US 
administration was hesitant to further inflame the Muslim world by initiating action 
in another Islamist state. The US experts argued that a US-initiated intervention in 
Darfur was “not going to happen” because they were “already mired down in one 
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Muslim country and the Muslim world would be furious if we took action in 
Sudan”.374 
 Yet, despite its indecisive and incoherent policy, the US played one of the 
most active roles on behalf of a UN action in Darfur, especially after mid-2006.              
 
 4.1.2.2. China and Russia 
 
The attitudes of China and Russia towards the UN actions in Darfur were 
very parallel to each other. Their, especially China‟s, positions constituted obstacles 
for the decision-making process. They watered down draft resolutions which 
provisioned strict measures against Sudan, and they abstained in voting the 
resolution versions of those drafts. As it was mentioned above, the key factors 
leading to the reluctance of both states for a robust UN action were two: the non-
intervention principle and bilateral relationships with the Sudanese government. 
In principle, both China and Russia stood against to intervene in internal 
affairs of sovereign states. For the Darfur case, they reiterated their reluctance to vote 
for an intervention without the consent of the Sudanese government. Indeed, this 
attitude was very related to their internal concerns. Russia had problems with 
Chechnya, and China had problems with Tibet
375
 and Xinjiang Uyghur Province. On 
the other hand, both states had commercial interest in opposing sanctions and robust 
measures. China and Sudan were conducting oil trade; Sudan was the first overseas 
oil supplier of China. In 2005, when the sanction discussions were on the table in the 
Council, China was importing $3.4 billion worth of goods from Sudan. As Prunier 
pointed out, 96% of those trade goods were “petroleum products”.376 Likewise, 
                     
374
 Zissis, “Darfur: Crisis Continues.” 
375
 Jean Krasno and Mitushi Das. 2008. “Circumventing the Authority of the Council.” In Bruce 
Cronin and Ian Hurd, eds., The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority. 
London and New York: Routledge, p. 190. 
376
 Prunier, p. 178. 
 81 
 
Russia was trading oil and military equipment with Sudan. A large amount of 
weapons and transporter “Antonov An-12s” used in counterinsurgency were 
Russian-built equipments.
377
 Williams and Bellamy stated that “it [Russia] sold 
around $150 million worth of military equipments to Sudan, and in 2002 a $200 
million oil deal with the Sudanese government fell through.”378 Moreover, Russia 
feared that robust measures would make the Sudanese economy worse and the 
government would be unable to pay its trade dues to Russia.
379
 
Yet, both China and Russia chose not to veto the resolutions but to abstain. 
They thought that a Sudan in peace would be more beneficial for their interests and 
did not want to block the SC completely.
380
 Even more significantly, the recent 
developments showed that China played one of the key roles in convincing 
Khartoum to give its consent for a robust peacekeeping. Three reasons can be given 
for that change in its attitude. First, China had been blamed by the activists for the 
international inaction in Darfur since the beginning. Therefore, the state felt the 
necessity to change its bad reputation, especially to make the dark clouds over the 
2008 Beijing Olympic Games disappear.
381
 Second, China became aware that it had 
been destroying its relationships with powerful countries like the US. So that it 
started to play a more constructive role in peace process.
382
 Third, China was 
reviewing and reshaping its foreign policy with a “measured move from a policy 
based on strict respect for sovereignty and non-interference in other nations‟ 
domestic affairs to a policy that addresses transnational threats such as terrorism, 
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health pandemics, and climate change”.383 So to say, these factors led China to act in 
a more cooperative way with the Council in Darfur case.  
 
4.1.2.3. Muslim World  
 
In terms of religion, it is known that both the victims and the criminals in 
Darfur have been Muslim. This characteristic of the crisis complicated the situation 
for the fractions of international Muslim community. Although they agreed on the 
unacceptability of Muslim sufferings occurring in Darfur, they were separated in 
terms of their attitude towards a western intervention.
384
 Radical Islamists mainly 
focused on the US and the western interests in Darfur from a neo-colonial point of 
view. They believed that the main aim to intervene in Darfur would be to take the 
control over the Sudanese oil industry.
385
 In addition, they were sceptical for a UN – 
which they thought to be a US-led organization – intervention because of the fact 
that the Jewish lobby in the US had pressured for it. The radicals interpreted the 
attempts of the Jewish lobby as an attempt to destabilize Arab countries and acquire 
an upper hand in Palestinian issue.
386
 As last, they connected the UN intervention 
with the US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan and rejected the idea of the US presence 
in another Muslim country.
387
 After the SC adopted Resolution 1706, al Qaeda 
declared it as “another instrument of American imperial occupation of Muslim 
land”.388 One year later, the videotapes of Osama bin Laden himself were released in 
which he called for “‟jihad against the crusader invaders‟”.389 He had said 
beforehand that their aim was not to defend the Sudanese government, but to defend 
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Islam with its lands and people.
390
 On the other hand, moderate Muslims focused on 
the reluctance and inability of Arab-Muslim governments to take the initiative to end 
the conflict. They were in favour of cooperation with the UN to stop Muslims‟ 
sufferings.
391
 In an article of Islam Online Muslim Affairs Team, even the 
establishment of UNAMID was considered as a positive development for Darfur.
392
  
 
        4.1.3. Attitude of the Sudanese Government 
 
 President Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir of Sudan was prejudicious about the 
motives of the foreign countries to intervene in Darfur. He suspected that the main 
intention was to overthrow him. Therefore, he believed that “the Americans, 
supported by the British and the French, might try to use the UN in Darfur, the 
European troops in Chad or even the rebels to get rid of his regime”.393 This 
scepticism had been expressed in various speeches of both the delegates and the 
President himself since the beginning. For instance, in the SC meeting adopting 
Resolution 1556, the Sudanese delegate identified the UN involvement with “Trojan 
horse” and furiously asked394  
...if the Sudan would have been safe from the hammer of the Security Council 
even if there had been no crisis in Darfur, and whether the Darfur 
humanitarian crisis might not be a Trojan horse? Has this lofty humanitarian 
objective been adopted and embraced by other people who are advocating a 
hidden agenda? 
 
 As a result, the Sudanese government would insist on the African Union to be 
the “only body” that could “deal with Darfur”.395 Not only the rulers, but also the 
rebel groups stood against non-African intervention in Darfur. The SPLM/A stressed 
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that: “We are against foreign military intervention in Darfur. We have before us the 
case of Iraq. We do not want a similar situation to develop in Darfur, or Sudan.”396 
When the talks of UN military intervention in the region began in mid-2006, the 
Sudanese government started an internal campaign which created an enemy who 
wanted to “come in and steal their oil”.397 The UN intervention was considered as an 
“invasion” in the eyes of Sudanese public, both in the center and the peripheries. 
Even the ones in prisons waiting to be executed were said that they would be given 
guns and be “released to go and fight the UN”.398 Some of the tactics of the 
government to prevent the UN intervention were as follows. For example, the 
administration threatened the Council with undermining the economic, political, and 
security interests of the permanent members in Sudan.
399
 Likewise, it used the 
importance of peace process in the South as leverage against a robust action.
400
 
Moreover, the Sudanese government successfully played the sovereignty card against 
the international community, and used “regional anti-colonialist sensitives” to gain 
support from the African countries in principle terms.
401
 In addition, the government 
gained the support of Arab-Islam world by resembling the situation to Iraq case.
402
 
On the other hand, al Bashir threatened the West with impeding the access of 
humanitarian aids and conducted anonymous attacks on aid workers.
403
 
 Eventually, upon intensive public and private diplomacy efforts and Chinese 
cooperation, the President Bashir accepted the establishment of an hybrid force with 
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a “predominantly” African character.404 However, there are still problems occurring 
between the government of Sudan and the UN in deployment of UNAMID. 
 
4.2. UNAMID 
 
 As it was mentioned above, with Resolution 1769, the SC authorized the 
establishment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur on 
31 July 2007. The following section aims to give the details of the functional, 
organizational and financial features of the operation.  
 
        4.2.1. Functions  
 
 The Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission 
had set out the mandate of UNAMID in their report dated 5 June 2007, and the SC 
agreed upon those goals in Resolution 1769.
405
 According to that report, the hybrid 
operation would be mandated:
406
  
(a) to contribute to the restoration of neccessary security conditions for the 
safe provision of humanitarian assistance and to facilitate full humanitarian 
access throughout Darfur; 
(b) to contribute to the protection of civilian population under imminent threat 
of physical violence and prevent attacks against civilians, within its capability 
and areas of deployment, without projudice to the responsibility of the 
Government of the Sudan; 
(c) to monitor, observe compliance with and verify the implementation of 
various ceasefire agreements signed since 2004, as well as assist with the 
implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and any subsequent 
agreements; 
(d) to assist the political process (...), and to support the African Union-
United Nations joint mediation in its efforts to broaden and deepen 
commitment to peace process; 
(e) to contribute to a secure environment for economic reconstruction and 
development, as well as the sustainable return of internally displaced persons 
and refugees to their homes; 
(f) to contribute to the promotion of respect for and protection of human 
rights and fundemental freedoms in Darfur; 
(g) to assist the promotion of the rule of law in Darfur, (...), in consultation 
with relevant Sudanese authorities; 
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(h) to monitor and report on the security situation at the Sudan‟s borders with 
Chad and the Central African Republic. 
 
 In order to achieve these goals, the report provisioned tasks under three 
headings: support for the peace process and good offices, actively providing security 
conditions, and promoting the rule of law, governance and human rights.
407
  
 UNAMID was established as a Chapter VII mission. The SC stated in 
Resolution 1769 that the operation was authorized under Chapter VII to “take the 
necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its 
capabilities” in order to:408 
- protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure 
the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian 
workers. 
- support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, 
prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect 
civilians, without the prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of 
Sudan. 
 
The use of force in self-defense was considered as a standard for UN 
peacekeeping operation and was acceptable for Khartoum. However, the government 
had problems with the second part. One Sudanese defence ministry official, General 
Majzoub Rahamah, argued that UNAMID was not permitted to protect the civilians 
but only themselves.
409
 On the other hand, Romeo Dallaire, the former UN 
commander in Rwanda, claimed that the resolution was under Chapter VII and it 
permitted UNAMID to use force in civilian protection.
410
 Indeed, the same issue had 
been raised in the 5752nd meeting of the Security Council, which led to the adoption 
of Resolution 1769. Only the US delegate, Mr. Khalilzad stated that the UNAMID 
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could “enforce the will of the international community by the use of force”.411 
However, China reiterated that the purpose of the resolution was “‟to authorize the 
launch of the hybrid operation, rather than to exert pressure or impose sanction‟”.412 
As a result, in terms of civilian protection, an ambiguous reference to the 
responsibilities of the Government of Sudan was pronounced. So to say, although 
UNAMID was a Chapter VII mission, it was restricted to use force except two 
circumstances: self-defense, and as a response to “immediate threats” to civilians in 
its area of mission. Yet, de Waal argued, this response would not be provided with 
“wide-ranging powers that NATO had in Kosovo”.413 In short, UNAMID‟s mission 
would not be to wage war or to stand between belligerent militias in “full-scale 
combat”.414 
 The mandate and purpose of the mission have generally been contested and 
criticized to be vague.
415
 As understood from the points listed above, the primary 
objective of UNAMID is civilian protection. However, there was no proper strategy 
to train the UNAMID leadership or its troops for this task.
416
 In addition, the 
operation was rested on “flawed assumptions”.417 Indeed, UNAMID was not a peace-
enforcement but a peacekeeping operation, but it was deployed when there was no 
peace to keep. 
 
        4.2.2. Organization 
 
 UNAMID was established as an hybrid operation. Resolution 1769 recalled 
the Addis Ababa Agreement and confirmed that the operation would have a 
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predominantly
418
 African character.
419
 Apart from this, the operation would be very 
similar to other UN operations. The SC decided that there would be unity of 
command and control in accordance with basic principles of peacekeeping.
420
 The 
command and control structures would be provided by the UN. This characteristic 
was mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU 
Commission of 5 June 2007 that:
421
 
...For unity of effort and efficiency, all United Nations and African Union 
personnel deployed to the operation will be administered in accordance with 
United Nations rules, regulations, policies, directives and administrative 
instructions, as well as standard operating procedures, including, but not 
limited to, those relating to performance, conduct and discipline. 
 
 As to say, the nature of this “hybrid” operation would be as such: command 
and control from the UN, troops and high rank officials from Africa. The head of the 
mission would be appointed jointly by the AU and the UN under the name of the 
Joint Special Representative of the AU and UN for Darfur.
422
 The same process 
would be valid for the appointment of the Force Commander, the Police 
Commissioner and the deputies under them. In addition, those leaders would be 
accountable both to the AU and the UN. This was a unique, but also a problematic 
characteristic of UNAMID. It was mentioned that the operational responsibilities 
would be carried by the UN, so the mission ought to be accountable to the Secretary-
General. On the other hand, communicational capabilities of the AU were not 
developed as of the UN, and that created an imbalance within the UNAMID 
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partnership in terms of the AU access to information.
423
 So to say, the hybrid 
operation was rested on an asymmetrical partnership.
424
       
 When the composition of the military and police personnel in UNAMID are 
considered, the distinct African character of the mission becomes apparent. Initially, 
most of existing AMIS troops “rehatted” – literally taking off their green berets and 
putting on the blue ones – and constituted the UNAMID force.425 However, what it 
meant for troops to be “predominantly” African was not defined at the outset. 
Instead, the Sudanese government was given the right to “scrutinise contributor 
countries”.426 That created a delay in deployment as the UNAMID officials had to 
await permission from Khartoum on troop composition.
427
 It was experienced that 
Sudanese authorities rejected non-African troops from countries like Norway and 
Sweden, and accepted troops coming from Muslim or “friend” countries like 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and China.
428
 So to say, almost 82% of total number of troops 
became African.
429
 According to the latest figures, the troop contributing countries 
are as follows: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, China, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, 
Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
430
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 As for the number of troops, Resolution 1769 stated that UNAMID would 
consist of up to
431
   
19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison 
officers, and an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,772 police 
personnel and 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each. 
 
 Those numbers meant that at its full strength, UNAMID would have 
approximately 20,000 military and 6,000 civilian components. However, the 
deployment of the forces were rising too slowly. At the outset, the existing AMIS 
troops, which were approximately 10,000 in number, were converted to UNAMID 
troops. It was considered as the fastest way of deployment for the initial period.
432
 
The increase in number of personnel could start in May 2008. The existing forces 
were added units which were mainly composed of engineers to set up the 
“infrastructure required by infantry and police units”.433 From then on, the strength 
of UNAMID has increased with a low slope as seen in the diagram below:
434
   
Graph 1: UNAMID Deployment from January 2008 to June 2009
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 The factors affecting the progress of deployment can be given as the 
reluctance of the Sudanese government to cooperate; postponements of contributor 
states to deploy; and environmental and logistical challenges to operate in Darfur.
435
 
As for the current situation, the most recent report of Secretary-General on UNAMID 
declared that 79% of the mandated number of military personnel had been deployed 
by 21 January 2010.
436
 This ratio became 73% for civilian staff.
437
 Secretary-General 
observed – when the mission left two years behind – that “UNAMID has made 
significant progress towards full deployment and is now focused on its critical tasks 
of protecting civilians and facilitating humanitarian delivery”.438   
 
        4.2.3. Funding 
 
 In his report regarding the establishment of a hybrid force in Darfur, the 
Secretary-General stated that he would recommend the UN to provide funding for 
UNAMID “through the United Nations assessed budget”.439 By its resolution 66/232, 
the General Assembly accepted the establishment of a special account for UNAMID, 
and approved a budget of $1,275,7 million for the period between 1 July 2007 and 30 
June 2008.
440
 It meant that although the mission was formulated as a hybrid force, it 
would be funded through the assessments of UN members.  
For the current period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010, the budget of 
UNAMID was approved as $1,598.94 million.
441
  
 As for providing a general roundup for this chapter, it can be said that since 
the outbreak of the conflict, the UN has been blamed to give a late, reluctant and 
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ineffective response to Darfur crisis. Indeed, as the diagram below suggested, most 
of civilian deaths had occurred before the SC finally decided to discuss the situation 
in the last quarter of 2004. 
Graph 2: Results from mortality surveys in Darfur between January 2004 to January 
2008.
442
 
 
 The AU/UN hybrid operation has been criticized on the similar grounds, as 
well. Many commentators argued in the first year of the operation that it would at 
best be indifferent to AMIS, otherwise would become “‟the world‟s worst 
peacekeeping operation‟”.443 Indeed, the mission lacked necessary resources, and 
faced operational, logistical, tactical challenges. Such incapabilities of the mission 
left the Darfurians, humanitarian workers and even UNAMID peacekeepers 
vulnerable to continuing attacks and widespread violence.
444
 Up to the present, 
UNAMID has counted 57 fatalities among its peacekeepers due to the ongoing 
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crisis.
445
 Both the government of Sudan and the international community are to 
blame for the shortcomings of UNAMID. The Sudanese government has stalled 
deployment by playing the consent card on issues like troop composition, permission 
for night flights, etc.
446
 On the other hand, donor countries have not kept their 
promises regarding their efficient support to UNAMID.
447
 Those challenges have 
endangered the accomplishment of the mission‟s mandate. Recently, UNAMID has 
declared in its official website that:
448
    
UNAMID continues to face shortfalls in troops and critical transport and 
aviation assets. The Secretary-General has led appeals to the international 
community to provide the mission with the capabilities it needs, especially 
helicopters, so that it can fulfill its mandate and live up to the expectations of 
the people of Darfur and the international community. In the meantime, 
UNAMID is doing all in its power and with limited resources to provide 
protection to civilians in Darfur, facilitate the humanitarian aid operation, and 
help provide an environment in which peace can take root. 
 
 Moreover, one of the main reasons of UNAMID‟s ineffectiveness has been 
the assumption that it was established on. The mission was established as a standard-
type of new generation UN peacekeeping operation while the fighting was going on. 
As a result, it became inevitable for UNAMID not to get stuck in continuing fighting 
in the region. In short, it is argued that UNAMID was established to “satisfy western 
public demand for military intervention”, but was “not tailored to Darfur‟s 
realities”.449 
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CHAPTER V 
 
EVALUATION OF THE UN INTERVENTION  
IN DARFUR 
 
 
This last chapter aims to provide a final analysis of the UN intervention in 
Darfur crisis within the framework established in Chapter II. Under four general 
headings, it attempts to answer the following questions: How can the basic principles 
of UN peacekeeping be applied to the intervention in Darfur? Can we assess the 
success or failure of the mission? If so, does the ongoing operation tend to succeed or 
fail? Why does the UNSC decide to intervene four and a half years later than the 
outbreak of the crisis? In other words, what were the reasons for the capable 
countries to be reluctant to intervene? And as last, this chapter attempts to find out 
how the case can be evaluated within the context of humanitarian interventions? As it 
can be understood from the order of the questions, while first two parts provide a 
narrower analysis regarding the ongoing operation, UNAMID, the other parts try to 
reach more general conclusions regarding the UN practice of interventions in the 
contemporary era.  
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5.1. Applying Basic Principles of Peacekeeping to the UN Intervention in Darfur 
 
This part is very much related to how to define the UN intervention in Darfur 
first. In that sense, the characteristics of the AU/UN hybrid operation simply fit to 
the framework drawn in the Brahimi Report and the Capstone Doctrine for the new 
generation peacekeeping operations. It is explained in the second chapter of this 
study that both documents affirm the consent, impartiality and non-use of force 
except self-defence to remain as the basic principles of UN peacekeeping. However, 
they re-operationalize these principles in order to improve the effectiveness of 
operations and to prevent the similar failures experienced in previous missions.
450
 
Now, it is worth to ask how those basic principles are applied in UNAMID case.
451
  
The issue of consent has been one of the main concerns for UNAMID both 
during the discussions regarding the military intervention in Darfur and during the 
deployment and conduct of forces. It was mentioned that Resolution 1706, which 
decided to extend the mandate of UNMIS to include Darfur, could not be 
implemented due to the rejection of the Sudanese government to give its consent. 
Upon this, the international community started to put economic pressure on Sudan 
and initiated intense diplomatic efforts to be able to get the permission of Khartoum 
for military operation. Eventually, UNAMID could be established when the consent 
of the government was taken. This insistence on the Sudanese consent is one of the 
main indicators that although Resolution 1769 authorized the mandate of UNAMID 
under Chapter VII, the mission is a peacekeeping operation, not an enforcement. 
Apart from acquiring the consent, the Brahimi Report warns that especially in 
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intrastate conflicts “consent may be manipulated in many ways”.452 For example, “a 
party may seek to limit an operation‟s freedom of movement, adopt a policy of 
persistent non-compliance with the provisions of an agreement or withdraw its 
consent altogether”.453 Indeed, this has been the case for UNAMID constituting one 
of the main challenges that the operation has faced. By playing the consent card, 
Khartoum has slowed down the progress of deployment and has decreased the 
efficiency of the mission. UNAMID officials have had to wait for the government 
approval on troop composition, and for permission on issues like night flights, etc.
454
        
As for the impartiality principle, neutral characteristic of UNAMID was 
mentioned even before the authorization of the mission. In their report dated 5 June 
2007, the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission emphasized 
that the political solution to the conflict would only be sustainable if the parties were 
convinced that the peacekeeping force would be “strong, impartial [and] 
proactive”.455 The Brahimi Report warns that the impartiality principle cannot be 
applied in all cases as “neutrality” or “equal treatment of all parties”.456 However, in 
UNAMID case, impartiality has been considered as “absolute neutrality in dealing 
with all parties involved in the conflict”.457 Joint AU/UN Special Representative 
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Rodolophe Adada claimed that such interpretation of impartiality was the “only way 
for the mission to achieve its mandate”.458 
In traditional peacekeeping operations, there was a symbolic use of force only 
for the self-defense of the UN operation. This characteristic has been considered as 
one of the main reasons of ineffective operations. Therefore, the Brahimi Report 
emphasizes on the necessity for more costly and robust forces in order to deter the 
spoilers.
459
 Likewise, the Report of High-Level Panel argues that missions should 
have enough capacity to respond spoilers with force when they try to “undermine a 
peace agreement and put civilians at risk”.460 As a result, in the Capstone document, 
the principle of non-use of force except self-defence has been changed as non-use of 
force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.
461
 When UNAMID is 
analyzed within this framework, it is seen that the mission is established according to 
this understanding. At its full deployment, the mission would consist of a huge and 
costly peacekeeping force with approximately 26,000 personnel.
462
 In addition, it 
was authorized under Chapter VII to use force not only to protect its personnel, 
facilities, equipment, etc., but also to support the implementation of the peace 
agreement and to protect civilians.
463
 Indeed, its authorization under Chapter VII led 
to discussions whether UNAMID would be a peace enforcement mission. However, 
it was soon understood that this characteristic was another feature of UNAMID 
which made it a new generation peacekeeping operation as Chapter VII mandate has 
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become the usual practice for both peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in 
the contemporary era.
464
 
In short, UNAMID can be categorized as a peacekeeping operation which is 
loyal to the basic principles as outlined in contemporary reports. The next question to 
analyze is how the mission can be evaluated in terms of success/failure of UN 
peacekeeping operations.      
 
5.2. Success of the Operation 
 
Many commentators and international actors have warned since the 
deployment of UNAMID that the mission was on the edge of failure due to its 
ambiguous mandate, the reluctance of the Sudanese government to cooperate, and 
“unfulfilled” commitments of international actors in terms of resources.465 On the 
other hand, both the NGOs in field and the UN itself declared that despite enormous 
challenges, obstacles and tragedy that UNAMID has faced, the operation has 
succeeded to count several achievements, as well.
466
  
Success is a problematic concept for peacekeeping operations. It is relative 
and highly depends on from which perspective one evaluates the operations. In other 
words, the assessment may change regarding one‟s tendency to see the glass half 
empty or half full. It is a matter of fact that the evaluation becomes more difficult 
when the success/failure of a continuing mission is considered, as it is not possible to 
observe the long-term consequences of the operation. Therefore, one needs to be 
cautious before putting labels on UNAMID. As a result, this study hesitates to define 
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the operation as succeeded or failed. Rather, it tries to evaluate the progress and 
effectiveness of UNAMID. In this assessment, the definition and criteria listed in 
Chapter II are utilized. This means that the study of Darya Pushkina is taken into 
consideration which regards success according to the “completion of the mandate” 
and “the mission‟s contribution to the UN‟s broader goals of international security 
and reduction of human suffering”.467 When the mandate of UNAMID and four 
criteria listed by Pushkina are combined, the operation is assessed through four basis: 
Can UNAMID limit the violence, improve the security conditions and protect 
civilians? How does UNAMID contribute to reduce human suffering? What are the 
developments in peace process? And, how does the existence of UNAMID affect the 
regional stability?  
 In terms of security conditions, the situation have been relatively calm than it 
was a few years ago. At least, civilians are not the main targets anymore. In addition, 
although international forces have faced attacks and counted fatalities, they have not 
been an “automatic” target unlike in Iraq and Afghanistan.468 Yet, the operation has 
still been in Phase IV since July 2008 according to the five-phase security 
management of the UN.
469
 The significant type of violence in Darfur has been 
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derived from clashes between the rebel groups and government forces. In addition, 
especially after the signing of the DPA, there has occurred widespread inter-tribal 
fighting.
470
 It is a fact that UNAMID has not been mandated to stand between 
fighting parties and stop the violence. However, it has even been ineffective in many 
situations which are within its mandate due to the lack of resources. The rebel groups 
has had the advantage of being highly mobile and the Sudanese army has had the air 
power. Therefore, when such attacks have risked the lives of civilians, UNAMID 
could not take action to protect them as it has been ill-equipped. Moreover, 
UNAMID could not be able to prevent attacks on its convoys and patrols as it has 
lacked combat helicopters which would be able to provide “backup fire” in such 
situations.
471
 Therefore, the mission itself has limited its task to a considerable and 
cautious level. Since July 2008, the soldiers have started to concentrate on protecting 
UN facilities and staff, and providing security for civilians “in and around” IDP 
camps.
472
 Indeed, there were incidents in which UNAMID acted robustly to save 
civilian lives. For example in January and February 2009, there occurred intense 
fighting in Muhajeria in South Darfur between the Sudanese forces and JEM putting 
tens of thousands of civilians at risk. As a response, the Sudanese government 
declared that it would use “‟all means possible‟” against JEM and warned UNAMID 
to pull out its troops. However, UNAMID refused to leave the civilians in the area 
and prevented a large-scale attack which would cost civilian lives.
473
 Unfortunately, 
such cases in which UNAMID acted in a rapid and robust manner have been the 
exception rather than the rule.
474
 This case has been an indicator that the Sudanese 
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government was indeed reluctant to cooperate with UNAMID, and the mission could 
do more to save civilians if better-equipped. 
 UNAMID‟s contribution to reduce the human sufferings has been very much 
related to its task to protect the civilians. After realizing the mission‟s incapabilities, 
UNAMID could provide very little to civilians outside the camps. At most, the 
soldiers have been patrolling the displaceds to move to safe camps.
475
 As for the 
people in IDPs camps, UNAMID has shown the most significant progress. In its first 
six months, the mission was restricted in terms of number of staff and suitable 
infrastructure, and could patrol the camps only in daylight hours. Apart from this, 
they were escorting women who had to leave the camp in search of firewood, water, 
food, etc.
476
 There were not enough troops, and civilians were complaining about the 
lack of security. They reported that either themselves or their friends became 
subjected to rape, beating, abduction, even murder when they got outside the camps 
without escorts and at nights when UNAMID troops were not on duty.
477
 The turning 
point for UNAMID to take the initiative to change the situation was Kalma incident. 
Kalma has been the biggest camp in South Darfur with 100,000 IDPs. At night time 
on 28 August 2008, the Sudanese police forces tried to enter the camp in search for 
rebels and arms. When the camp residents attempted to respond, the police forces 
opened fire and caused death of approximately fifty civilians including women and 
children.
478
 From then on, UNAMID has taken the measures for a twenty-four hour 
patrol presence within the camps.
479
 This incident again has shown how desperately 
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UNAMID has been in need of additional troops and resources to fulfill the core of its 
mandate.  
 In cases when UNAMID was provided with necessary troops and logistics, 
and when the Sudanese government was ready to cooperate, it was possible to 
observe the positive impacts on mission‟s effectiveness. For example for the delivery 
of humanitarian supply, the UN reviewed the year 2009 as:
480
   
In a major initiative to unblock the supply routes from Khartoum to El 
Fasher, UNAMID managed to reduce the journey for supply convoys from 
Port Sudan to El Fasher from 11 days to four (...) In addition to more timely 
delivery of supplies, the mission received vehicles that were utilized to 
deliver water to the local population and building materials that enabled the 
construction of facilities for the mission and the people of Darfur alike. 
 
 It was mentioned that these developments could be brought by a combination 
of “an increased deployment of military personnel and assets, (...) improvements to 
the logistical supply chain” and “increased cooperation with the Sudanese police who 
provided escorts in areas outside of Darfur where the mission is not mandated to 
operate”.481 
 As for the peace process, in Resolution 1769, UNAMID is mandated “to 
monitor, observe compliance with and verify the implementation of various ceasefire 
agreements signed since 2004, (...) assist with the implementation of the Darfur 
Peace Agreement and any subsequent agreements”.482 Furthermore, the operation 
was authorized even to use force when necessary to “support early and effective 
implementation of the [DPA]”.483 Indeed, this has been kind of a mission impossible 
for UNAMID. The council members did not consider (or did not want to consider) 
that as previous agreements such as the N‟djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire, the DPA 
was a flawed peace agreement both in the eyes of the non-signatory rebel groups and 
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the Darfurians. The agreement was infamous for those people as it was connected to 
the increased violence in the region and intensified conflict among tribes afterwards. 
Even AMIS had lost its prestige upon its insistence on the implementation of the 
DPA.
484
 As a result, UNAMID also carried the risk to be seen as illegitimate in the 
eyes of local people. Needless to say, the mission has not been able to succeed in 
supporting the implementation of the DPA. Instead, while the political process and 
mediation efforts have continued at the higher level, UNAMID has focused on 
establishing dialogue among local tribes. Its works have constituted the Darfur-
Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC).
485
 These efforts have not been too 
spectacular to receive huge media attention unlike big political conferences, but 
nonetheless have helped to “reduce the level of violence in Darfur” and “spread a 
culture of non-violence in conflict management”.486  
 Meanwhile, the government of Sudan and one of the rebel groups, JEM, 
agreed to attend the AU/UN mediated talks in Doha, Qatar in early 2009.
487
 These 
talks have resulted in the signing of a temporary ceasefire and “framework” 
agreement in February 2010 including issues like compensation for Darfurians, 
humanitarian access, power and wealth sharing.
488
 Yet, the other rebel group which 
has a strong support from the local population and IDPs has refused to attend the 
talks since the beginning demanding an “end to violence before negotiations”.489 It is 
early to comment on UNAMID‟s role in implementation of that agreement between 
JEM and Sudanese government. However, there are signals that it carries the risk to 
be one of the volatile ceasefires signed during seven-year conflict in Darfur. The 
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rejection of SLA to negotiate and the words of the spokesman of JEM are two of 
them. Before signing the deal, Ahmed Hussein Adam of JEM emphasized on the 
temporary characteristic of the ceasefire and said, “’we will not play their game if 
they are only interested in buying time, in tactics, in just signing papers to make it 
easier for them in the elections.‟"490 He further declared that "‟the vicious circle can 
begin again and we can resume our armed struggle.’"491    
 As for regional stability, it can be said that UNAMID has had no observable 
effect on. On the contrary, the tensions between Chad and Sudan have endangered 
the actions of the mission.
492
 They share a common border along western Darfur and 
both governments bilaterally have accused the other of sponsoring the rebel groups 
within its territories against the Sudanese or Chadian governments.
493
 Noticing that 
the conflict in one area would affect the other, the UNSC have urged UNAMID “to 
coordinate closely with other United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the 
United Nations in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)” in 
Resolution 1881.
494
 Since the end of 2009, the relations between two countries have 
been improving mainly because both governments have been searching for security 
and stability towards their elections.
495
 
 The analyses above indicate that although it has been two and a half years 
from the deployment of UNAMID, the mission has not been able to fulfill its 
mandate effectively except some achievements. This is due to the flaws within its 
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mandate to a great extent. Furthermore, both the unwillingness of supporting states to 
provide necessary resources such as troops and aviation assets, and the attitude of 
Khartoum towards cooperation have decreased the chance of UNAMID to succeed. 
It is understandable for the Sudanese government to show reluctance as its position 
has been along a similar line even before the military intervention. However, the 
inability of western states to keep their promises regarding reinforcement of 
UNAMID strengthens the argument that the mission was established just to “satisfy 
western public demand for military intervention”.496  
 Now, let‟s turn to pre-UNAMID era and try to analyze why the UNSC was 
reluctant to intervene in Darfur militarily despite the fact that the huge amount of 
conflict-related civilian deaths occurred in the first few years. 
 
5.3. Reluctance to Intervene 
 
 When the discussions and attitudes of member states provided in previous 
chapters are considered, the reasons of reluctance can be listed under two general and 
two specific categories.
497
 The general reasons are first the impact of the „war on 
terror‟; and second, the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. On the other 
hand, the specific reasons are related to the host country, Sudan. These are first the 
strategic and economic interests of members states in Sudan; and second, the peace 
process in the other civil war of Sudan between north and south. 
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 The 9/11 attacks had a threefold effect on the willingness to intervene in 
Darfur, especially for the US. First, following the 9/11 attacks, the strategic priorities 
of the US – the most capable country in the SC – have shifted to terrorism, the 
proliferation of WMD and “‟rouge states‟”. Therefore, the US administration became 
less willing to intervene only with humanitarian purposes in areas that were “remote 
from US vital interests”.498 Related to this, the wars in Afghanistan and especially in 
Iraq led to military and financial overstretch for major western powers such as the 
US and the UK, and made the intervention in Darfur not feasible for those 
countries.
499
 Second, emphasizing on humanitarian purposes as one of the 
justifications of Iraq War decreased the credibility of both the major western states 
arguing for humanitarian interventions and the very idea of humanitarianism itself.
500
 
The Sudanese government, most of the permanent and non-permanent members of 
the SC, and many countries in the GA became suspicious that such an intervention 
would mask neo-imperial ambitions such as “gaining access to Sudan‟s oil”.501 Third 
effect was related to the role that Sudan played in the „war on terror‟. The US 
administration would not want to lose the Sudanese government as an Arab ally in 
that sense.
502
    
 The second factor of general reasons for reluctance is related to the notion of 
sovereignty and the respect to non-intervention principle. During the discussions in 
the SC regarding the Darfur crisis, most of the permanent and non-permanent 
members reiterated their respect to the Sudanese sovereignty. They emphasized that 
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as a result, it would be the responsibility of the government of Sudan to protect the 
civilians within its territory.
503
 
 As for specific reasons, the economic and strategic interests of the member 
states in Sudan can be given as the first concern. The strategic importance of Sudan 
for the US is mentioned above. The US interest was in the cooperation with 
Khartoum against terrorism especially in terms of intelligence. In addition, the 
administration chose to think strategically that advocating a forceful intervention in 
Sudan would deepen the anti-US attitude of Arab/Muslim world which had been 
heightened with the wars in Afghanistan and especially in Iraq.
504
 On the other hand, 
the economic interests were related to oil and arms trade with Sudan. Two permanent 
members, China and Russia, considered Sudan as an important trade partner and did 
not want an intervention without Khartoum‟s consent to damage their relations.505 
 The last factor to be explained is about the other internal problems of Sudan. 
The country had been experiencing “Africa‟s longest running civil war” between the 
ruling north and the southern rebel group SPLM/A.
506
 When the Darfur conflict was 
at the peak, the international community was busy with diplomatic efforts to 
conclude Machakos/Naivasha peace process which would end the conflict with the 
south. Therefore, the crisis in Darfur was placed at “secondary” level.507 Any kind of 
forcible intervention in Darfur would threaten the completion of Machakos/Naivasha 
process according to many commentators. However, Williams and Bellamy believed 
that this process might not actually resolve the “underlying causes of Sudan‟s 
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multiple civil wars” and would privilege the SPLM/A “at the expense of Sudan‟s 
other groups”.508 
 These four concerns explained above constituted the main reasons for the 
unwillingness of the member states to intervene in Darfur. Now, a further analysis 
will be made depending on the basis provided in the second chapter. First of all, 
making a review of what is mentioned in that part is beneficial.
509
 For the members 
to decide to involve in an internal conflict, there are two main factors: engagement of 
P-5 interests and the existence of a threat to international peace and security. In order 
to measure these factors, five criteria are listed for the former and three criteria are 
listed for the latter.  
When the criteria concerning the engagement of interests are analyzed within 
the Darfur context, it is seen that the tendency would not be towards intervention, but 
nonintervention. First, the conflict did not occur “on” or “near” the territory of a P-5 
member. Second, it was true that the region had strategic and economic importance 
for the members. However, the continuation of strategic and economic gains 
necessitated not to push for a forceful intervention. Third, the conflict did not 
threaten or involve a former ally. Fourth, there were not strong historical, ideological 
or political ties between one of the members and any party to the conflict. It was true 
that the region had been a British colony until 1956; in addition France had ties with 
Chad which would be affected by the instability in the region. However, those 
countries did not pursue a decisive policy along the lines of intervention. Fifth, as 
explained in the reasons part, the decision to intervene would be in conflict with 
calculations about “costs, benefits, and risks” to a great extent. 
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 On the contrary, when the Darfur case is applied to the criteria concerning the 
international peace and security, two of them are affirmative that the situation would 
require intervention. First, the conflict was not contained within the Sudanese 
territory and spread to the neighbouring Chad harming the relationship between Chad 
and Sudan. In addition, it is possible to notice that in all resolutions discussed as 
regarding the conflict in Darfur, the SC determined that the situation constituted a 
“threat to international peace and security”.510 Second, the conflict constituted 
serious violations of international humanitarian law. Such violations were even 
reported by the ICID and confirmed by the ICC. The third criteron argues that the 
intervention is likely if the conflict threatens “access to strategic resources such as 
oil” or occurs in a strategic part of the world. For Darfur, none of them existed. On 
the contrary, it was the government of Sudan having strategic and economic 
relationships with the members, and the southern part having the strategic resources 
such as oil. Darfur was just a land buffering between Sudan, Chad and Libya. Yet, 
the previous two criteria were supporting the idea for a more robust action. 
 In the final analysis, those two factors related to the decision-making to 
intervene in internal conflicts were not along the parallel lines for Darfur case. In the 
words of Paul Williams and Alex Bellamy, “strategic imperatives created a perceived 
need to appease the Sudanese government (...), while humanitarian concerns 
suggested the need for greater levels of coercive pressure against that 
government”.511 In short, reluctance of member states to argue for a more robust 
action in the early years of the conflict shows that the concerns about interests did 
prevail the humanitarian ones in that case. 
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5.4. Assessment within the Context of Humanitarian Interventions 
 
 As it was explained in the second chapter, the SC has the legal right to 
authorize an intervention under Chapter VII on humanitarian grounds. In addition, 
there is a “partial consensus” among “some liberal states” that in extreme 
humanitarian cases, there occurs a moral right to intervene without the SC 
authorization.
512
 Yet, Article 39 of the UN Charter provides the SC as the main body 
to “determine the existence of any threat” to international peace and security. When 
the cases in the post-Cold War era are considered, it is realized that the SC 
interpretation of “international peace and security” has been expanded to include the 
issues like refugee flows, endangered civilians, human sufferings, coup against a 
democratically elected government, ethnic cleansing, etc.
513
 Likewise, the situation 
in Darfur, which doubtlessly represented a “supreme humanitarian emergency”514, 
has been defined as “constituting a threat to international peace and security” in SC 
resolutions, in the declarations of UN officials, and in countless reports. Therefore, it 
is worth to analyze the lack of action by the SC as a whole and the individual 
members within the context of humanitarian interventions. 
 The Darfur case indicates mainly two matters regarding humanitarian 
intervention. The first is related to the impact of the Iraq war on the normative 
progress of the concept. And the second is related to the idea of the responsibility to 
protect.
515
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 In improvement of the level of consensus on the norm of humanitarian 
intervention, the US and the UK have stood as the major “norm carriers”.516 
However, their arguments and position on Iraq war have diminished their credibility 
as such. This has had two implications in Darfur context. First, their arguments for 
humanitarianism could have less resonance among “sceptics”517 due to introducing 
humanitarian rationale for invading Iraq.
518
 Second, their military overstretch has 
become an obstacle to reveal a strict position against one of the worst humanitarian 
crisis in the world.
519
 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink argue that new norms 
would take the place of old ones after a period of dispute and rivalry.
520
 Therefore, 
when the norm carriers are thought to be abusing the norm for their self-interests, 
then the process of change is “likely to be slowed or reversed”.521 
 As for what the Darfur case implicates for the responsibility to protect idea, 
one can conclude that the language of the idea has led the case for intervention to 
two opposite directions. One is the way to legitimize the opposition to intervene in 
humanitarian emergencies, while the other is the way to support.
522
 This lies in the 
very basic principles of the R2P idea that the ICISS formulated in 2001. In the 
Commission‟s report, there are two basic principles. The first one considers the 
sovereignty as responsibility and declares that “state sovereignty implies 
responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with 
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the state itself”.523 The second principle reminds the responsibility of international 
community and argues “where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of 
internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is 
unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect”.524 But before analyzing the contradicting 
adaption of the basics of the R2P idea, it is beneficial to explain its role in the UN.  
 As it is mentioned in the second chapter, after the ICISS established the R2P 
framework, the reactions were positive to a great extent. The idea was added in the 
UN reform debate and embraced by the members in the UN World Summit of 2005. 
As a result, it was added to the World Summit Outcome Document with three 
referring paragraphs.
525
 Since then, the principle has been considered as a “‟new 
declaratory commitment to protect endangered populations‟” and as a “‟normative 
innovation‟”.526 However, there were some differences with the original form of R2P 
in the Outcome Document which were made for the sake of reaching a consensus 
between the opponents and the advocates. In paragraph 139, the Document declares 
that the international responsibility to “‟take collective action‟” would be beared “’on 
a case-by-case basis’” and when “the national authorities manifestly fail to protect 
their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity”.527 Cristina Badescu and Linnea Bergholm argue that this paragraph 
“provides foundation for taking action when political will exists”, but does not 
explain what to be done when there is reluctance.
528
 That is to say that its emphasis 
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on taking responsibility on a case-by-case basis and when the governments 
manifestly fail to protect their citizens create ambiguities in terms of providing 
political commitment of members to intervene.
529
 This is obvious when the idea is 
applied to Darfur case. 
 For the humanitarian suffering in Darfur, almost all labels which the principle 
of R2P lists as necessitating action are used. The US Congress called the crisis 
genocide unanimously in July 2004, followed by the Secretary of State in September 
and many activist groups such as Physicians for Human Rights. Later the same 
month, EU parliamentarians declared that the actions of Khartoum could be 
“‟construed as tantamount to genocide‟”.530 Not calling the crisis genocide, in 2005, 
the ICID reported that while the rebels were responsible for war crimes, the 
Sudanese government committed crimes against humanity. Indeed, even if there 
were no R2P principle, calling a crisis genocide would necessitate a further action 
according to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. From that dimension, many academics like Hugo Slim argue that “the 
response to Darfur was more shameful than the response to Rwanda” as the 
international community did not hide behind the denial of what was going on in 
Darfur to legitimize inaction.
531
 Although the situation in Darfur was labeled as war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and even genocide, what the SC did was to adopt 
the first principle of the R2P rhetoric and refer to Khartoum as the responsible body 
to protect civilians in the region. The flaws in the Paragraph 139 of the Outcome 
Document is apparent here that there is provided no measure to decide when the 
government manifestly fail to do so. If an administration was reported to commit 
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crimes against humanity but was not considered as failed to protect its nationals, then 
which state would be taken as manifestly failed in future cases? Only countries like 
Romania and Philippines mentioned the responsibility of the SC to stop the 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur, yet could not find much support among other states 
which insisted on emphasizing the Sudanese sovereignty as responsibility. Indeed, 
the language of the R2P carries the risk to create an ambiguity providing a ground for 
both constraining and enabling intervention even for the same case. This is very 
much related to the political will of states to act; and in Darfur case, such a 
willingness was not ranking high due to the reasons explained in previous section.  In 
Bellamy‟s words, the debates in the SC have shown that “changing the language of 
the intervention debate has done little to forge consensus or overcome the struggle 
between sovereignty and human rights”.532 That is to say that, establishing criteria to 
govern humanitarian intervention does not bring the most important dimension – 
political willingness of states to intervene in such cases – automatically.533 
 In short, Darfur case took place at a time when two opposite processes were 
developing. On the one hand, the post 9/11 period were bringing a reversal trend to 
the normative progress of humanitarian intervention idea. On the other hand, the UN 
was adopting the R2P idea in order to create an effective mechanism to regulate 
humanitarian intervention norm. Through this, the members were showing their 
sacrifice from sovereignty principle in order to deal with genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Within this conjuncture, it would be 
early to reach general conclusions just considering Darfur as a test case. Yet 
doubtlessly, the civilians in Darfur have become the victims of both the impacts of 
the war on terror, and flaws in the operationalization of newly adopted R2P idea. 
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Needless to say, both of these factors have been consequences of the same old 
political unwillingness. Simon Chesterman argues that the notion of sovereignty have 
not prevented states from acting to save strangers when they have had the means and 
the will.
534
 So to say, when there are reluctance and lack of necessary means, the cost 
for civilians becomes higher as in the Darfur case.      
 To conclude, although the UN has started to reflect a greater intention to save 
the people facing atrocities, the practice has shown so far that the “business-as-
usual”535 has not changed. What exactly summarizes this position is the statement of 
Krasno and Das arguing:
536
 
The paradigm shift from the notion of “national security” to the concept of 
the sovereign person or “human security” has not yet taken place in minds of 
government leaders who have their own personal agendas. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
                         “Alas, man and woman cannot live by rhetoric alone.” 
 
 This study has aimed to explain and analyze the Darfur case within the 
context of UN interventions in intrastate conflicts. In other words, it has attempted to 
examine what the Darfur case has demonstrated for the UN trend of responding to 
humanitarian crises in the 21st century. It is a matter of fact that in the recent decade, 
there have been significant attempts to regulate the norm of humanitarian 
intervention and to increase the effectiveness of peace operations. Indeed, significant 
normative progress has been achieved in rhetoric especially in notion of sacrificing 
state sovereignty for the sake of human security. Yet, in the final analysis, it can be 
concluded that the decisions of whether, when, where and how to intervene in 
internal crisis are still shaped by the political calculations of member states.  
UN intervention in intrastate conflicts is a problematic issue as one of the 
core principles of the organization is „non-intervention‟, and as it may lack necessary 
capabilities to deal with complex nature of internal crisis. However, with the shift in 
conflicts from inter-state to intra-state level in the post-Cold War period,  the UN has 
found itself as the main body to settle the internal disputes. The previous decade 
 117 
 
witnessed severe failures of the UN in that sense such as the Somalia, Bosnia and 
Rwanda. As a result, the organization has conducted „lessons-learned‟ studies and 
has attempted to find ways in order to regulate the ad hoc nature of peace operations   
and to increase the effectiveness of them. The crisis in Darfur outbroke during this 
process. Many scholars and politicians have tended to see this case as a „test case‟ for 
the UN in terms of dealing with the humanitarian crises in this new era. Indeed, the 
Darfur case is interesting to study with the timing and the humanitarian dimension of 
the crisis, and with the attitudes of member states in responding to it. In examining 
the case, this thesis draws conclusions on the basis of four points regarding the UN 
operation in Darfur and what the case demonstrates for UN interventions in intrastate 
conflicts within a broader scope. 
The first conclusion is related to peacekeeping operations in general. The 
characteristics of the AU/UN hybrid mission in Darfur fit to the principles of new 
generation peacekeeping operations. It has been authorized under Chapter VII to use 
force both to protect the mission and the civilians with an unprecedented number of 
troops for peacekeeping missions. Yet, it is not a peace enforcement as the mission 
could be deployed only after an agreement was signed documenting a peace to keep, 
and after the consent of the government was taken. So to say, the operation in Darfur 
constitutes an example for the future operations in which the borders of traditional 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian interventions of 1990s are 
blurred.  
Besides that, the deployment of UNAMID reflects the development of two 
opposite processes in the meanwhile. The normative process and the “bold 
statements” of member states to stop atrocities have created a state of pressure 
mainly from the public and the media on the SC to act. On the other hand, the impact 
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of the post 9/11 period has highlighted the strategic concerns of states diminishing 
their political willingness to bear the responsibility to protect the civilians in another 
state. As a result, UNAMID was deployed with a vague mandate, with a flawed 
peace agreement on hand, and with unkept commitments to reinforce the mission. 
That is to say that the combination of political will and military means were lacking 
for UNAMID as necessary ingredients of an effective peacekeeping operation. Yet, 
as argued by Flint and de Waal, the mission was created even on flawed assumptions 
in order to satisfy the public demand for a more robust action.  
The second conclusion is related to the success/failure of the operation. 
UNAMID was destined to be ineffective from the very beginning due to its 
inadequate mandate and ill-equipped troops. The reluctance of member states to 
fulfill their commitments regarding the support for the mission, and the negative 
attitude of the Sudanese government in cooperation have worsened situation further. 
Indeed, this study reveals that UNAMID has been able to achieve some of its tasks 
when it has been provided with necessary means and when the Sudanese government 
has showed willingness to cooperate. However, such incidents have been exceptions 
rather than the rule. It would be misleading to label an ongoing operation as failure; 
yet, it is a matter of fact that UNAMID has been ineffective to fulfill its mission for 
the previous two and a half years. 
As the third, this study reaches a conclusion regarding the decision to 
intervene. When the engagement of P-5 interests in the conflict is concerned, the 
expected action for the SC would be not to intervene in Darfur crisis. On the other 
hand, when the commitments of the members related to the international peace and 
security are taken into account, the level of humanitarian sufferings and the situation 
in the region would require a more robust action. The attitude of the SC towards the 
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Darfur issue was ignorance in the first years of the crisis – when the conflict-related 
civilian sufferings had been at the peak – and reluctance to intervene even after the 
reports of the ICID, the ICC, etc. As a result, the response to Darfur case 
demonstrates that when the national agenda is in conflict with humanitarian 
concerns, pursuing interests does still prevail saving strangers. 
 The fourth assessment is related to the UN practice of humanitarian 
interventions. The case leads to two conclusions in that sense. First, the Darfur issue 
has been affected by the consequences of the Iraq war which has diminished the 
prestige of the major “norm carriers”. They have been blamed either for abusing the 
norm for their self-interests or for ignoring the humanitarian crises in other parts of 
the world as a result of their military overstretch in Iraq. As a result, the normative 
progress has tended to slow down affecting the response to Darfur crisis. Second, the 
case has demonstrated that there are flaws within the language of the responsibility to 
protect doctrine. The principle considering the state sovereignty as responsibility has 
been utilized as an alibi for inaction. This shows that the attempts to regulate the 
norm could not bring a solution to the most important obstacle to intervene: lack of 
political will. As a result, the ad hoc nature of humanitarian interventions does not 
seem to change for a long while.  
 As concluding remarks, it should be noted that the aims of this thesis have not 
been to discuss whether the use of military force would be the best solution in a 
humanitarian crisis, or ask “what if” questions considering an intervention at the 
earlier level of Darfur crisis. Instead, this thesis has tried to analyze the UN 
intervention in Darfur case through focusing on the level of consistency between the 
rhetoric and the action. As a result, it has reached to a general conclusion that despite 
the level of normative progress in the discourse, the practice has changed little than 
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the “business-as-usual”. That is to say that, still the political calculations shape the 
decisions of the SC to a great extent to intervene in humanitarian crisis.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 121 
 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
 
Abass, Ademola. 2007. “The United Nations, the African Union and the Darfur 
 Crisis: Of Apology and Utopia,” Netherlands International Review LIV: 415-
 440. 
 
Abiew, Francis Kofi. 1999. The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of 
 Humanitarian Intervention. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. 
 
Africa News: Sharing Views on Africa. February 7, 2009. “Sudan: Rebel Groups 
 Withdraw  From South Darfur, Says UN” Available at 
 http://africaheadlines.wordpress.com/2009/02/07/sudan-rebel-group-
 withdraws-from-south-darfur-says-un/.  
 
African Press Organization. April 16, 2010. “Darfur/UNAMID Daily Media Brief.” 
 Available at http://appablog.wordpress.com/2010/04/16/darfur-unamid-daily-
 media-brief-136/. 
 
Al Jazeera. February 22, 2010. “Al-Bashir to Sign Darfur Peace Deal.” Available at 
 http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/02/2010222124520248470.html. 
 
AlertNet. February 9, 2010. “Sudan, Chad Agree „Definitive End‟ to Proxy Wars.” 
 Available at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE61827T.htm. 
 
AMIS. “African Union Mission in Sudan.” Available at http://www.amis-sudan.org/.  
 
Amnesty International. July 18, 2004. “Sudan: Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War: 
 Sexual Violence and Its Consequences.” Available at 
 http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR54/076/2004/en/f66115ea-d5b4- 
 11dd-bb24-1fb85fe8fa05/afr540762004en.pdf. 
 
Badescu, Cristina G. and Linnea Bergholm. 2009. “The Responsibility to Protect and 
 the Conflict in Darfur: The Big Let-Down,” Security Dialogue 40(3): 287-
 309. 
 
BBCNews. February 20, 2010. “Sudan and Chad to End Hostilities.” Available at 
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8507363.stm. 
 
Bellamy, Alex J. 2005. “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in 
 Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq,” Ethics&International 
 Affairs 19(2): 31-53. 
 
 122 
 
Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. 2006. “The UN Security Council and the  
 Question of Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur,” Journal of Military Ethics 
 5(2): 144-160. 
 
Bellamy, Alex J., P. Williams, and S. Griffin. 2004. Understanding Peacekeeping. 
 Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Bolton, John. 2008. Surrender is not An Option: Defending America at the United 
 Nations and Abroad. New York: Threshold Editions. 
 
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 1992. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, 
 Peacemaking and Peace-keeping. New York: United Nations. 
 
Brunk, Darren. 2008. “Dissecting Darfur: Anatomy of a Genocide Debate” 
 International Relations 22: 25-44. 
 
Bull, Hedley (ed.) 1988.  Intervention in World Politics. Oxford University Press. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Factbook: Sudan.” Available at 
 https://www.cia.gov.  
 
Chesterman, Simon. 2001. Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and 
 International Law Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
CNN. September 9, 2004. “Powell Calls Sudan Killings Genocide.” Available at 
 http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/09/09/sudan.powell/. 
 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court. “Resolution 1593.” Available at 
 http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=res1593. 
 
Collins, Robert O. 2008. A History of Modern Sudan. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press. 
 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 1948. 
 Available at http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/text.htm.   
 
Cottey, Andrew. 2008. “Beyond Humanitarian Intervention: The New Politics of 
 Peacekeeping and Intervention,” Contemporary Politics 14(4): 429-446. 
 
Council of the European Union. “EU Support to AMIS (Darfur).” Available at 
 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=956&lang=en. 
 
Daly, M.W. 2007. Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide. New 
 York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Darfur Consortium, The. July 28, 2008. “Putting People First: The Protection 
 Challenge Facing UNAMID in Darfur.” Available at 
 http://www.darfurconsortium.org/darfur_consortium_actions/reports/2008/Pu
 tting_People_First_UNAMID_report.pdf. 
 
 123 
 
de Waal, Alex (ed.) 2007. War in Darfur and The Search for Peace. Cambridge: 
 Harvard University Press. 
 
de Waal, Alex. 2007. “Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect,” 
 International Affairs 83(6): 1039-1054. 
 
DPKO. “List of Operations 1948-2009.” Available at 
 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/list.shtml. 
 
Druckman, Daniel and Paul Stern. 1997. “Perspectives on Evaluating Peacekeeping 
 Missions,” The International Journal of Peace Studies. Available at 
 http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol4_1/druckman.htm.  
 
Eriksson, Mikael and Peter Wallensteen. 2004. “Armed Conflict: 1989-2003,” 
 Journal of Peace Research 44(5): 625-636. 
 
Evans, Gareth. 2008. “The Responsibility to Protect.” In Richard Cooper and Juliette 
 V. Kohler, eds., Responsibility to Protect: The Global Moral Concept for the 
 21st Century. Palgrave Macmillan: New York. 
 
Fadul, Abdul-Jabar and Victor Tanner. 2007. “Darfur after Abuja: A View from the 
 Ground.” In Alex de Waal, ed., War in Darfur and the Search for Peace. 
 Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Farrel, Theo. 2003. “Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations.” In J. Baylis, 
 J. Wirtz, E. Cohen and C. Gray, Strategy in Contemporary World. Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press. 
 
Finnemore, Martha. 2003. The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the 
 Use of Force. New York: Cornell University Press. 
 
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and 
 Political Change,” International Organization. 52(4): 887-918. In Bellamy, 
 Alex J. 2005. “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in 
 Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq.” Ethics&International 
 Affairs, 19(2): 31-53, p.32.   
 
Flint, Julie and Alex de Waal. 2008. Darfur: A New History of a Long War. London, 
 New York: Zen Books.  
 
Garret, Stephen A.. 1999. Doing Good and Doing Well: An Examination of 
 Humanitarian Intervention. Westport: Praeger. 
 
General Assembly Resolution No. 2625. October 24, 1970. “Declaration on 
 Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
 operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
 Nations,” (A/8082). 
 
 
 124 
 
Gompert, David C. and et al. 2005. “Learning from Darfur: Building a Net-Capable 
 African Force  to Stop Mass Killing.” Center for Technology and National 
 Security Policy. Available at 
 http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DTP%2015%20Darfur.pdf. 
 
Gray, Christine. 2000. International Law and the Use of Force. Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press. 
 
Hagan, John, and Wenona Rymond-Richmond. 2008. Darfur and the Crime of 
 Genocide. Cambridge University Press.  
 
Hamilton, Rebecca and Chad Hazlett. 2007. “‟Not on Our Watch‟: The Emergence 
 of the American Movement for Darfur.” In Alex de Waal, ed., War in Darfur 
 and the Search for Peace. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Hehir, Aidan. 2008. Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo: Iraq, Darfur and the  
 Record of Global Civil Society. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Holzgrefe, J. L. 2003. “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate.” In J. L. Holzgrefe 
 and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and 
 Political Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur. January, 25 2005. “Report of the 
 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
 Secretary-General.” Geneva.  
 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. 2001a. 
 Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background. Ottawa: 
 International Development Centre. 
 
-----. 2001b. The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission 
 on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa: International Development 
 Research Centre. 
 
International Court of Justice. “Statute of International Court of Justice.” Available at 
 http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0. 
 
International Criminal Court: Press Release. March 4, 2009. “ICC issues a warrant of 
 arrest for Omar Al Bashir, President of Sudan.” Available at http://www.icc-
 cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20release
 s%20(2009)/icc%20issues%20a%20warrant%20of%20arrest%20for%20oma
 r%20al%20bashir_%20president%20of%20sudan. 
 
International Criminal Court: Press Release. September 20, 2007. “ICC Prosecutor 
 on Darfur: „Justice must be at the top of our agenda.‟” Available at 
 http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situati
 on%20icc%200205/press%20releases/icc%20prosecutor%20on%20darfur_%
 20%E2%80%9Cjustice%20must%20be%20at%20the%20top%20of%20our
 %20agenda%E2%80%9D . 
 
 125 
 
International Crisis Group. “Reports by Region: Sudan.” Available at 
 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1230&l=1. 
 
Joint NGO Statement, A. July, 2009. “Building A Better UNAMID.” Available at 
 http://www.darfurconsortium.org/member_publications/2009/July/ST.Buildin
 gaBetterUNAMID.093109.pdf . 
 
Krasno, Jean and Mitushi Das. 2008. “Circumventing the Authority of the Council.” 
 In Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd, eds., The UN Security Council and the Politics 
 of International Authority. London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Krizner, Tomo. October 4, 2006. “Sudan Sees UN Intervention as an Invasion.” 
 Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/tomo-
 krizner-sudan-sees-un-intervention-as-an-invasion-418603.html. 
 
Kurth, James. November, 2005. “Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq: Legal Ideals 
 vs. Military Realities.” Orbis. 50(1): 87-101. Available at 
 http://www.fpri.org/orbis/5001/kurth.humanitarianinterventionafteriraq.pdf. 
 
Lebor, Adam. 2006. “Complicity with Evil”: The United Nations in the Age of 
 Modern Genocide. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.  
 
Lewis, Stephen. 2005. Race Against Time. Toronto: Anansi Press. 
 
Liégeois, Michel. 2009. “Darfur: Mission Impossible for UNAMID?” Les Rapports 
 du GRIP 2009/6.   
 
Lyons, G. M., and M. Mastanduno. 1995. Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and
 International Intervention. London: The John Hopkins University Press. 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood. 2009. Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on 
 Terror. New York: Pantheon Books. 
 
Mayroz, Eyal. 2008. “Ever Again? The United States, Genocide Suppression, and the 
 Crisis in Darfur,” Journal of Genocide Research 10(3): 359-388. 
 
Melvern, Linda. 2006. “Rwanda and Darfur: The Media and the Security Council,” 
 International Relations 20(1): 93-104. 
 
Miller, Molly J. 2007. “The Crisis in Darfur,” Mediterrenean Quarterly 18(4): 112-
 130. 
 
Mullenbach, Mark J. 2005. “Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International
 Influences on the Establishment of Third Party Peacekeeping Missions,”  
 International Studies Quarterly 49: 529-555. 
 
Murphy, Sean D. 1996. Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an
 Evolving World Order. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
  
 126 
 
Nardin, Terry. 2006. “International Political Theory and the Question of Justice,” 
 International Affairs 82(3): 449-465. 
 
Nathan, Laurie. 2007. “The Making and Unmaking of the Darfur Peace Agreement.” 
 In Alex de Waal, ed., War in Darfur and the Search for Peace. Cambridge: 
 Harvard University Press. 
 
Neack, Laura. 1995. “UN peacekeeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?”
 Journal of Peace Research 32: 181-196. 
 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Assisting the African Union in Darfur, Sudan” 
 Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49194.htm. 
 
O‟Fahey, R. S. 2008. The Darfur Sultanate: A History. London: Hurst. 
 
Oudraat, Chantal de Jonge. 1996. “The United Nations and Internal Conflict.” In 
 Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. 
 Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 
 
Philips, Robert L. 1996. “Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention.” ın Robert L. Philips 
 and Duane L. Cady, Humanitarian Intervention: Just War vs. Pacifism. 
 Maryland: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
 
Piiparinen, Touko. 2007. “The Lessons of Darfur for the Future of Humanitarian 
 Intervention,” Global Governance 13: 365-390. 
 
Power, Samantha. 2004. “Business As Usual at the UN,” Foreign Policy 144: 38-39. 
 
Prendergast, John and Colin Thomas-Jensen. June, 2007. “An Axis for Peace in 
 Darfur: The United States, France, and China” Enough Project Available at 
 http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Axis%20of%20Peace.pdf. 
 
Prunier, Gérard. 2008. Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide. Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
 University Press. 
 
Pushkina, Darya. 2006. “A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful 
 Peacekeeping Mission,” International Peacekeeping 13(2): 133-149.  
 
Regan, Patrick M. 1998. “Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal
  Conflicts,” Journal of Politics 60(3): 754-779. 
 
ReliefWeb. April 24, 2008. “Scientific Evidence supports UN OCHA Extrapolation 
 on Darfur Mortality. “ Available at 
 http://www.reliefweb.int/rwarchive/rwb.nsf/db900sid/AMMF7DZHT5?Open
 Document. 
 
ReliefWeb. February 20, 2010. “Sudan signs ceasefire with Darfur JEM rebels.” 
 Available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/FBUO-
 82UHKN?OpenDocument. 
 
 127 
 
Report of High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. 2004. A More 
 Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. New York: United Nations.  
 
Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations. August 2000. Available at
 http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/.  
 
Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union 
 Commission on the Hybrid Operation in Darfur. June 5, 2007. 
 S/2007/307/Rev.1.  
 
Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid 
 Operation in Darfur. January 29, 2010. S/2010/50. 
 
Rosenau, James N. 1969. “Intervention as a Sceintific Concept,” Journal of Conflict 
 Resolution 13(2): 149-171. 
 
Seybolt, Taylor B. 2007. Humanitarian Military Intervention:The Conditions for 
 Success and Failure. Slona: SIPRI. 
 
Slim, Hugo. 2004. “Dithering over Darfur? A Preliminary Review of the 
 International Response,” International Affairs 80(5): 811-828. 
 
Snow, Donald M. 2010. Cases in International Relations. New York: Longman. 
 
Sriram, Chandra Lekha, Olga Martin-Ortega, and Johanna Herman. 2010. War, 
 Conflict and Human Rights: Theory and Practice. New York: Routledge.  
 
Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position paper of the Secretary-General on the
 occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the UN. January 3, 1995 A/50/60-
 S/1995/1. 
 
Tan, Kok-Chor. 2006. “Duty to Protect.” In Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams, 
 eds., Humanitarian Intervention. New York: New York University Press. 
 
Toga, Dawit. 2007. “The African Union and the Abuja Peace Talks.” In Alex de 
 Waal, ed., War in Darfur and the Search for Peace. Cambridge: Harvard 
 University Press. 
 
Udombana, J. Nsongurua. 2007. “Still Playing Dice with Lives: Darfur and Security 
 Council Resolution 1706,” Third World Quarterly 28(1): 97-116.   
 
UN Charter. Available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.  
 
UN Dispatch Global News and Views. February 24, 2010. “Darfur Peace Deal 
 Signed. But Will It Last?” Available at http://www.undispatch.com/darfur-
 peace-deal-signed-will-it-last. 
 
 
 
 128 
 
UNAMID Press Release. January 7, 2008. “Press Statement by AU-UN Joint Special 
 Representative for Darfur on the Sudan-Chad border situation.” No/01/2008. 
 Available at 
 http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=900&ctl=Details&mid=107
 3&Itemid=663.  
 
UNDP Human Development Reports. “Human Development Report 2009: Sudan.” 
 Available at http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries. 
 
United Nations News Centre. December 5, 2003. “Humanitarian and Security 
 Situations in  Western Sudan Reach New Lows, UN Agency Says.”  
 Available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=9094.  
 
United Nations Peace Operations 2009: Year in Review. 2009. Available at 
 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/yir2009.pdf. 
 
United Nations Peacekeeping. Official Website. Available at 
 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/.  
 
-----. “UNAMID.” Available at 
 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid.  
 
-----. “UNMIS.” Available at 
 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml. 
 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. 2008. Available 
 at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.  
 
United Nations Press Release. March 31, 2005. “Press Release SC/8351 Security 
 Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International 
 Criminal Court.” Available at 
 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm. 
 
United Nations Security Council 4988
th
 Meeting. June 11, 2004. S/PV.4988. 
 
United Nations Security Council 5015
th
 Meeting. July 30, 2004. S/PV.5015. 
 
United Nations Security Council 5040
th
 Meeting. September 18, 2004. S/PV.5040. 
 
United Nations Security Council 5519
th
 Meeting. August 31, 2006. S/PV.5519. 
 
United Nations Security Council Resolution. June 11, 2004. S/RES/1547 (2004).  
 
-----. July 30, 2004. S/RES/1556 (2004). 
 
-----. September 18, 2004. S/RES/1564 (2004). 
 
-----. March 24, 2005. S/RES/1590 (2005).  
 
-----. August 31, 2006. S/RES/1706 (2006). 
 129 
 
-----. July 31, 2007. S/RES/1769 (2007). 
 
-----. July 30, 2009. S/RES/1881 (2009). 
 
United Nations Sudan Information Gateway. February, 2010. “Sudan Humanitarian 
 Overview,” 6(2). Available at 
 http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/Sudan%20Humanitarian%20Overview%20v
 ol6%20no2%20Feb%202010.pdf. 
 
-----. 2009. “Darfur Humanitarian Profile  No.34.” Available at 
 http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/090330%20DHP%2034%20narrative%201%
 20January%202009.pdf.   
 
USAID. 2010. “Sudan – Complex Emergency: Situation Report #6, Fiscal Year (FY) 
 2010.”  Available at 
 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/
 MINE- 845S8D-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf.  
 
Vincent, R. J. 1974. Nonintervention and International Order. New Jersey: Princeton
  University Press. 
 
Wax, Emily. April 23, 2006. “5 Truths About Darfur.” The Washington Post. 
 Available at 
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/04/21/AR20060
 42101752.html. 
 
Weber, Cynthia. 1995. Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic
 Exchange. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Weiss, Thomas G. 2008. Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action. Cambridge: 
 Polity  Press. 
 
Weiss, Thomas G., D. P. Forsythe, and R. A. Coate. 1997. The United Nations and
 Changing World Politics. Boulder, Co.: Westview. 
 
Williams, Paul D. and Alex J. Bellamy. 2005. “The Responsibility to Protect and the 
 Crisis in Darfur,” Security Dialogue 36(1): 27-47. 
 
World Food Programme. “Countries: Sudan.” Available at 
 http://www.wfp.org/countries/sudan.  
 
World Savvy Monitor. 2008. “The Situation in Sudan and the Conflict in Darfur.” 
 Available at 
 http://worldsavvy.org/monitor/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
 &id=67&Itemid=115.  
 
Zissis, Carin. May 4, 2006. “Darfur: Crisis Continues.” Council on Foreign 
 Relations. Available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/10600/darfur. 
 
 
 130 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX A: SUDAN AND DARFUR MAP
537
 
 
 
                     
537
 Retrieved from http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/sudan.pdf.  
 131 
 
APPENDIX B: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT MAP – JULY 2009538 
 
 
 
                     
538
 Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,UNCART,,SDN,456d621e2,4a4e14372,0.html. 
